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ABSTRACT

Ryu, Wonsang. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2016. Three Essays on Competition and
Cooperation in R&D Alliances. Major Professors: Thomas H. Brush and Jeffrey J. Reuer.
In this dissertation, I investigate the interplay between competition and
cooperation in R&D alliances. The alliance literature on this issue has emphasized that
product market rivalry (i.e., market overlap) between partnering firms aggravates
cooperation hazards by increasing the private benefits from opportunism. However,
drawing on the multimarket competition literature, I maintain that market overlap
between alliance partners can rather curb opportunism by partners because the
multimarket contact between them might increase the expected costs of opportunistic
behaviors by enabling broad retaliation against such behaviors across the shared markets.
Based on this argument, I theorize and corroborate that the mutual forbearance from
opportunism that multimarket contact generates not only promotes the formation of R&D
collaborations in Essay 1, but also substitutes for hierarchical governance structures in
R&D alliances in Essay 2. In Essay 3, I also extend the prior literature on competitive
aspects of R&D collaborations that has been mainly interested in knowledge protection
concerns in alliances between direct rivals. I join the alliance literature with the
agglomeration literature to argue and show that geographic co-location between an
allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the allying firm introduces potential indirect

xi
paths of knowledge leakage to rivals, making the allying firm more likely to employ
defense mechanisms such as using equity structures and reducing task interdependence.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Although competition and cooperation are fundamental concepts in the field of
strategy and are inherently interdependent, the research streams on the two concepts have
often tended to be developed separately, resulting in a lack of understanding on the
interplay between them. In a similar vein, the alliance literature, one of the main research
streams on cooperative strategy, has also paid relatively less attention to the competitive
context of inter-firm collaborations. Though scant, however, there is a stream of research
called “competition-oriented cooperation studies (Chen, 2008)”1, and this literature has
contributed to our understanding on the interplay between competition and cooperation
by investigating how competitive relationships between alliance partners affect the
outcome of their collaborations.
The key argument commonly made by the competition-oriented cooperation
literature is that competition undermines cooperation (Harrigan, 1988; Oxley & Sampson,
2004; Park & Russo, 1996), that is, competitive relationships between collaboration
partners incentivize them to undertake opportunistic behaviors (e.g., shirking,

1
The competition-oriented cooperation studies belong to the broad competition-cooperation research that
also includes co-opetition studies and cooperation-oriented competition studies according to Chen's (2008)
categorization. The competition-oriented cooperation studies are distinguished from the co-opetition studies
in that the former focus on partner firms’ competition and cooperation within their partnerships, such as
strategic alliances, while the latter mainly examine the simultaneous pursuit of competitive and cooperative
strategies at the firm level. In addition, competition-oriented cooperation studies and cooperation-oriented
studies are opposite to each other in terms of the cause-effect relationship of interest. The former are
interested in how competition between partners affect their collaborations, while the latter use cooperationrelated variables to predict competitive concerns.
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misappropriation, and hold-up) by increasing the return from such behaviors. As a result,
collaborations between rivals tend to fail or need extra remedies for these contractual
hazards. Furthermore, this stream of research has also claimed that as the partners’
competitive domains come to a complete overlap, perfect cooperation in their
collaboration approximates a zero-sum game and thus, the cooperation-eroding effect of
competition increases with the market overlap between partners (Oxley & Sampson,
2004). Along this line of thought, prior empirical work in this research stream has also
tended to use co-presence in the same broadly-defined domain (e.g., 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classification [SIC]) to conceptualize the competitive tension between
collaboration partners, and it has shown that alliances between partners from the same
domain tend to be short-lived and have a narrow scope (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000;
Gulati, 1995a; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997).
Although the prior work on the competitive aspects of collaboration has
contributed to our understanding on the interplay between competition and cooperation, I
observe three important research gaps in the literature. First, the literature has exclusively
focused on the benefit of opportunistic behaviors in collaborations between rival firms,
ignoring the possibility of the partner’s competitive reactions to the opportunistic
behaviors and the associated cost. As firms competitively respond to the actions
undertaken by others (Porter, 1980; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991),
opportunistic behaviors also can invoke retaliation, and the loss caused by the retaliation
might be larger than the initial gain from the opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, the
cost caused by retaliation against opportunism might increase with the degree of market
overlap between partner firms because broad retaliation across more markets can damage
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the partner firm more seriously. Therefore, the possibility of a competitive response to
opportunism and the number of market contacts should be considered to estimate the net
effect of competition between collaboration partners on their inclination toward
opportunism.
Second, while the existing literature has paid substantial attention to how the
competitive relationships in end-product markets that alliance partners have affect their
cooperation, it has not been interested in how the end-product market rivalry interacts
with other types of inter-firm relationships between alliance partners in influencing the
partner’s decisions concerning the partnership. Firms compete not only in end-product
markets, but also in factor markets. In addition, firms are embedded in cooperative
relationships that they have formed through prior cooperation experience. Therefore,
considering these distinct interfirm relationships that alliance partners have outside an
alliance might enhance our understanding on the interplay between competition and
cooperation.
Third, while the competition-oriented cooperation literature has been mainly
interested in direct competitive relationships between partner firms, it has paid little
attention to indirect competitive linkages surrounding collaborations. In inter-firm
partnerships (particularly R&D alliances), valuable knowledge and technologies are
inevitably shared between partner firms and therefore, they are concerned about
knowledge leakage to the partners, especially when they collaborate with their rivals.
This direct knowledge leakage to partnering rivals has been extensively discussed in the
literature (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989;
Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). However, knowledge
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leakage to rivals takes place not only through direct interactions, but also through indirect
paths. Although some recent research has begun to address this issue of indirect
knowledge leakages (Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2015; Mesquita, Anand, & Brush,
2008; Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, & Hallen, 2015), our understanding on this issue is still
limited, at least partially due to the prior research’s exclusive focus on indirect paths that
formal interfirm relationships form.
In this dissertation, I aim to fill these three research gaps using R&D alliances in
high-technology industries as a theoretical context, because R&D alliances are
particularly prone to the risk of opportunism and entail a high level of knowledge loss
risk. More specifically, in Essay 1 (Chapter 2), I combine the multimarket competition
literature with the alliance literature on partner selection to argue that multimarket
contact2 between alliance partners can facilitate the formation of R&D collaborations by
generating mutual forbearance from opportunism.
The multimarket competition literature has argued and shown that as two firms
compete against each other in more markets, they mutually forbear from initiating attacks
for fear of broad retaliation by the attacked firm across the multiple shared markets
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Evans & Kessides, 1994; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Haveman &
Nonnemaker, 2000; Phillips & Mason, 1996). Accordingly, in R&D alliances featuring
the risk of opportunism by partners (Pisano, 1989), mutual forbearance generated by
multimarket contact between partner firms might also be able to curb opportunism, as
opportunistic behaviors are also a form of competitive action that partner firms can

2
In this dissertation, I use the terms market overlap, (multi)market contact, and shared markets
interchangeably.
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undertake within their collaboration. Based on this argument, I claim that the reduced
level of the risk of opportunism makes multimarket rivals attractive to each other as a
partner for technology cooperation, promoting the formation of R&D alliances between
them. I also maintain that this effect is more pronounced not only for technology
partnerships with high technological uncertainty, but also for those with a broader
vertical scope, as both cases entail greater contractual hazards.
By joining the multimarket competition literature with the alliance literature,
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) contributes to the competition-oriented cooperation literature by
theorizing and corroborating that market overlap between alliance partners can reduce the
risk of opportunism by increasing its cost. Unlike the conventional view that only
considers the benefit of opportunism in an agreement with a rival, this argument offers a
novel and more complete perspective on the effect of competition between alliance
partners on the risk of opportunism by considering the partners’ possible retaliatory
response to opportunism and the consequential costs.
In Essay 2 (Chapter 3), I examine how multimarket contact between R&D
alliance partners affects their alliance governance choices. The conventional view has
been that as direct competition between alliance partners aggravates the risk of
opportunism by partners, they need to employ more hierarchical governance structures as
a remedy for the risk, as they have a higher level of market overlap between them.
However, based on the same theory developed in Essay 1 (Chapter 2), I argue that
multimarket contact rather reduces the need for hierarchical governance modes by
generating mutual forbearance from opportunism. In addition, I further investigate how
different dyadic relationships between alliance partners (i.e., competitive relationships in
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end-product markets and factor markets and previous cooperative relationships) interplay
with one another in affecting the partner firms’ proclivity toward opportunism and
governance choice. Specifically, drawing on the recent multimarket competition literature
on factor market rivalry (Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009), I claim that factor
market rivalry intensifies mutual forbearance and thus, the substituting effect of
multimarket contact for hierarchical governance structures is intensified when the
alliance partners pursue similar technologies. In addition, based on the literature on
relational embeddedness (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b), I maintain that the same substituting
effect is weakened when alliance partners have previous cooperative ties, because prior
collaborative experience and multimarket contact play a redundant role in reducing the
risk of opportunism by partners.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) also contributes not only to the competition-oriented
cooperation literature, but also to the relational embeddedness perspective in the alliance
literature by showing that three distinct dyadic relationships between alliance partners,
i.e., end-product market rivalry, factor market rivalry, and prior collaborative
relationships, function as important boundary conditions to each other. The results
suggest that the two literatures complement each other and the simultaneous
consideration of the findings provides a more complete and comprehensive understanding
on how interfirm relationships in which alliance partners are embedded determine
cooperation hazards.
In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I attempt to fill the third research gap that the literature
has been mainly interested in knowledge protection concerns in alliances between direct
rivals and has paid little attention to indirect competitive linkages surrounding
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collaborations. Drawing on the agglomeration literature, I maintain that geographic colocation between an allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the allying firm is an
important but understudied factor that creates indirect paths of knowledge leakage to the
rivals. The agglomeration literature has shown that geographic co-location increases the
likelihood of knowledge spillovers to neighboring firms (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, &
Henderson, 1993), as well as transactions with them (Narula & Santangelo, 2009). Based
on these findings, I maintain that as there are more rivals co-located with the allying
firm’s partner, the allying firm is more exposed to the risk of knowledge loss to the rivals
and is thus more likely to employ defense mechanisms, such as (1) the inclusion of equity
arrangements to benefit from enhanced monitoring, control, and incentive alignment that
equity involvement can offer and (2) the reduction of task interdependence to reduce
knowledge sharing. I further claim that the effects of partners’ co-location with rivals on
governance choice and task interdependence are intensified by the nearby rivals’
absorptive capacity.
Based on the results from Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I also contribute to the emerging
literature on indirect competitive linkages by showing that the geographic co-location
between an allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the allying firm increases the
allying firm’s knowledge protection concerns. Geographic co-location as a factor creating
indirect paths of knowledge loss to rivals adds two interesting points to the literature.
First, while previous research has exclusively focused on indirect channels via formal
inter-firm relationships (Hernandez et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 2015), this approach based
on the geographic dimension shows that the literature needs to extend the scope of
inquiry to informal paths, as well. In addition, geographic co-location aggravates the risk
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of knowledge loss through unintentional knowledge spillovers. Therefore, firms need to
be concerned not only about the misappropriation of knowledge but also about the risk of
unintentional knowledge spillovers in R&D alliances.
For an empirical analysis, I use the biopharmaceutical industry as an empirical
context for all three essays for several reasons. First, the biopharmaceutical industry is a
high-technology industry where R&D alliances are regarded as an important means of
R&D activities and thus are frequently observed (Hagedoorn, 2002). Second, the
biopharmaceutical industry features clear market definitions based on therapeutic classes
that are widely accepted and commonly used by U.S. government authorities and industry
players (e.g., cholesterol regulators, anti-ulcerants, and anti-psychotics). As defining
markets is critical in all three essays, the clear market definition in the industry is of
crucial benefit to this dissertation and for the same reason, prior work in the multimarket
competition literature has been carried out in the industry (e.g., Anand, Mesquita, &
Vassolo, 2009). Third, the biopharmaceutical industry is characterized by agglomeration
(Folta, Cooper, & Baik, 2006). Because Essay 3 (Chapter 4) focuses on the geographic
co-location between an allying firm’s partner and its major rivals as a theoretical factor to
aggravate the allying firm’s concern about knowledge leakage to its rivals, I need an
empirical setting where firms agglomerate, and the biopharmaceutical industry meets this
condition well.
In summary, this dissertation investigates the effects of the direct and indirect
competitive relationships alliance partners have outside an alliance on partner selection,
governance choice, and task interdependence in R&D alliances. I draw on insight from
the multimarket competition literature and the agglomeration literature to shed new light
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on the competitive aspects of R&D collaborations. Based on the findings from the
multimarket competition literature, I argue and show that multimarket contact can not
only promote the formation of R&D collaborations, but also substitute for hierarchical
governance structures for the collaborative R&D efforts by increasing the costs of
opportunism that retaliation can cause. In addition, I join the agglomeration literature
with the alliance literature on knowledge protection concerns to theorize that the
geographic co-location between an allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the
allying firm creates indirect paths of knowledge leakages to rivals, thereby affecting the
allying firm’s decisions on governance modes and task interdependence. The three
studies contribute to the literature on the competitive context of collaborations with new
theories and findings.
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CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF MARKET OVERLAP ON PARTNER SELECTION
FOR TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

2.1

Introduction

Technology cooperation refers to “interfirm cooperation for which a combined
innovative activity or an exchange of technology is at least part of their agreement,” and
this interfirm arrangement includes various modes ranging from licensing agreements to
R&D joint ventures (Hagedoorn, 1993). Rapid technological changes characterizing
today’s economy render technology cooperation between firms more important than ever
to maintain competitive advantages. Since selecting appropriate partners is one of the
most critical factors to determine success or failure of any interfirm partnerships (Kale &
Singh, 2009), the literature has extensively investigated who partners whom (Gimeno,
2004; Gulati, 1995a; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014; Rothaermel
& Boeker, 2008). Although the literature has tended to focus on resource
complementarity as a criterion for partner selection, it has also suggested that other
criteria also become critical depending on the partnership context (Kale & Singh, 2009).
In particular, when partners’ behaviors are difficult to observe and the outcomes of
collaborations are highly uncertain (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kirsch, 1996), the risk of
opportunism by partners becomes a key criterion for partner selection (Shah &
Swaminathan, 2008). Since such exchange hazards often surround technology
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cooperation (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pisano, 1989), the risk of opportunism is an
important criterion for partner selection for technology cooperation.
In the literature investigating the risk of opportunism by partners, the relationships
between potential partners have received substantial scholarly attention. For instance,
many studies have supported the idea that previous cooperative relationships between
potential partners—prior ties—reduce the risk of opportunism (Dyer & Singh, 1998),
therefore making firms select previous partners repetitively (Gulati, 1995a). By contrast,
less attention has been paid to how competitive relationships between prospective
partners—in particular, market overlap in end-product markets—can have an impact on
partner selection. Extant research on market overlap and opportunism has tended to
regard market overlap between potential partners as a factor increasing the propensity for
opportunism by partners and ex post conflicts (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo,
1996). This is because market overlap between potential partners incentivizes the partners
to behave opportunistically by increasing the payoff from such behaviors in their
partnerships (Khanna et al., 1998). Although this argument has been rarely applied to
partner selection, it leads to the prediction that firms would avoid partners with market
overlap for technology cooperation at the margin. However, the multimarket competition
literature in industrial organization economics and strategy, to which the cooperative
strategy literature has paid little attention, provides a novel prediction opposite to the
conventional view: market overlap between potential partners reduces the risk of
opportunism and therefore facilitates technology partnerships.
More specifically, the multimarket competition literature argues that as firms
share more markets, they mutually forbear from taking aggressive actions for fear of
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broad retaliation across the shared markets (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards,
1955). This mutual forbearance hypothesis has been corroborated by many empirical
studies showing that multimarket overlap between firms reduces attacks such as price
cuts (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Hannan & Prager, 2004), market entry (Baum & Korn,
1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), and advertising (Strickland, 1985). In this paper, I
link this mutual forbearance generated by market overlap to the risk of opportunism by
partners. That is, I argue that since opportunistic behaviors are a kind of aggressive action
that partners can take in their partnerships, mutual forbearance can also curb such
behavior just as it does other kinds of attacks. Based on this argument, I claim that
reduced opportunism between partners with market overlap makes them more likely to
partner with each other for technology cooperation. Furthermore, I also examine some
contingencies that shape this relationship. Given that the preference for partners with low
risk of opportunism becomes stronger for cooperative agreements entailing a higher level
of contractual hazards, I investigate how technological uncertainty and vertical scope—
which are known to increase exchange hazards—condition the effect of mutual
forbearance on partner selection.
My theory and empirical results obtained from the global biopharmaceutical
industry contribute not only to the literature on partner selection but also to the broader
alliance literature by providing a novel view on market overlap and interfirm cooperation.
For instance, by linking market overlap to lower resource complementarity, previous
research has typically argued that since firms present in the same market niches are likely
to possess redundant assets rather than complementary assets, they are unlikely to enter
into a partnership (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995a; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008).
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However, tying market overlap to the risk of opportunism by partners rather than
resource complementarity, I claim that market overlap mitigates the risk of opportunism
by partners and therefore facilitates technology cooperation. Partners’ inclination towards
opportunism takes up more importance as a criterion to evaluate and select partners for
technology cooperation where the observability of partners’ behaviors and the
predictability of outcome are inherently low (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pisano, 1989; Shah
& Swaminathan, 2008). My arguments and findings therefore highlight the importance of
considering the multimarket context of partnerships and the potential for mutual
forbearance from opportunism during their formation of technology cooperation (Ariño
& Ring, 2010; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004; Li et al., 2008; Luo,
1997; Shipilov & Li, 2010) and I identify important boundary conditions for the effect of
market overlap on partner selection.
The way that I interpret the impact of market overlap on opportunism by partners is
also novel. Previous research has suggested that as two partners share more markets, the
benefit of opportunistic action within the collaborative agreement increases and therefore
the partners are exposed to a greater risk of opportunism (Oxley & Sampson, 2004).
Although this argument provides a useful insight into the incentives partners have in the
collaborative agreement, I suggest that it is also necessary to account for the partners’
possible responses against opportunism and the related costs causes by these responses.
Since market overlap strengthens partners’ retaliatory capacity, it can also increase the
cost caused by the retaliation against opportunism. Therefore, by integrating the
multimarket competition literature that addresses rivals’ actions and responses, I enrich
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the current understanding on the effect of market overlap on opportunism by partners
and, in turn, partner selection for technology cooperation.

2.2

2.2.1

Theory and Hypotheses

Multimarket Contact and Mutual Forbearance

Multimarket contact refers to two firms competing in more than one distinct
market (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). According to the multimarket competition
literature (Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013 for a
review of the literature), rivals having multimarket contact between them tend to
mutually forbear from attacks, therefore lowering the intensity of rivalry (Bernheim &
Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955). This lowered level of rivalry between multimarket
rivals has been corroborated by many previous empirical papers, where the attenuation of
rivalry has been measured by greater stability of market shares (Heggestad & Rhoades,
1978; Sandler, 1988), higher profitability (Hannan & Prager, 2009; Parker & Röller,
1997), higher prices (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Hannan & Prager, 2004), lower entry and
exit rates (Baum & Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), less frequent competitive
behavior (Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2007), smaller
investments in tangible and intangible resources (Kang, Bayus, & Balasubramanian,
2010; Shankar, 1999), and lower service quality (Prince & Simon, 2009).
Mutual forbearance takes place because multimarket rivals realize that an
aggressive action taken in one market may provoke broad retaliation by rivals, not only in
the market where the attack was initiated but also in other shared markets. This broad
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retaliation may eventually result in a larger loss than the initial gain in one market from
an attack (Evans & Kessides, 1994; Feinberg, 1985; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000;
Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Phillips & Mason, 1996). That is, the attacked firm’s ability
to retaliate to cause the attacker serious financial damage will then be taken into account
in analyzing the benefit and cost of current attacks. The shadow of the future created by
the prospect of broad retaliation functions to deter current attacks.
The potential for mutual forbearance between two firms increases with the degree
of multimarket contact between them because multimarket contact provides a better
ability and more opportunities to retaliate against current attacks (Jayachandran et al.,
1999). As two firms share more markets, retaliation across the shared markets can hurt
the attacker more seriously (Edwards, 1955). Also, the larger number of markets of
overlap means more areas to retaliate against current attacks (Jayachandran et al., 1999).
Furthermore, previous work has also shown that mutual forbearance potential depends
not only on the mere number of shared markets but also on some attributes of the shared
markets. Mutual forbearance potential increases with the strategic importance of the
shared markets because possible retaliation in an unimportant market may not provide
deterrence from attacks (Feinberg, 1985; Mester, 1987; Scott, 1982). Furthermore, the
asymmetry of strategic importance also affects the degree of deterrence. That is, as two
firms are more dissimilar in terms of their presence in the shared markets, the deterrence
between them becomes more effective (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999).
This is because if one firm has footholds of small market share in the other firm’s
important markets and vice versa, they can substantially hurt each other at a small cost,
and thus threats of retaliation become more credible (Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006;
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Gimeno, 1999). In addition, the number of competitors in the shared markets is also an
important factor influencing mutual forbearance potential because the detection of
deviation from mutual forbearance becomes harder, and retaliation becomes less
effective, as there are more other firms in the market (Evans & Kessides, 1994; Feinberg,
1985).

2.2.2

Mutual Forbearance from Opportunism in Technology Cooperation

In the context of technology cooperation, mutual forbearance between partners
with market overlap can reduce opportunism by partners given the shadow of the future
(e.g., Parkhe, 1993) that is created by possible broad retaliation. In a technology
cooperation agreement between two partners with no market overlap, one partner who is
victimized by the other’s opportunistic behavior has several options to respond to the
opportunistic behavior. For instance, barring a successful private resolution of a dispute,
the partners can appeal to third parties (e.g., courts) if their contracts include provisions
that are directly related to the detected opportunistic behavior (Reuer & Ariño, 2007).
However, the effectiveness of this option may be restricted owing to the inherent
incompleteness of contracts and the costs and lead time involved. Other options include
passive responses such as behaving opportunistically in an eye-for-an-eye fashion within
the partnership, terminating the relationship, and ruling out an opportunistic partner for
future cooperation. These options can also be ineffective because the first two hinder the
achievement of cooperation objectives and the last one would also be of limited
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effectiveness in creating a shadow of the future if the opportunistic partner views the
focal agreement in one-off terms.
If two partners have market overlap, however, one partner can effectively respond
to the other’s opportunistic behavior by retaliating in the overlapped end-product
markets. Furthermore, if market overlap between them is substantial and retaliation takes
place across the shared markets, it can cause the opportunistic partner substantial damage
(Jayachandran et al., 1999). One thing to note is that the market overlap between them
provides both partners with retaliatory capacity and, therefore, none of them cannot easily
initiate opportunistic behaviors. That is, the partners mutually forbear from
opportunistically behaving within the partnership because it may escalate the intensity of
their competition in the shared markets. The benefit from opportunistic behaviors in the
partnership may be not only uncertain but also marginal relative to the possible costs
caused by the intensified competition. In particular, if the two partners with market
overlap are currently enjoying substantial rents in the overlapping markets, they may
suffer a big loss in going after a small gain by behaving opportunistically in the
cooperation. In sum, as two firms have a higher level of mutual forbearance potential
generated by their market overlap, they experience a lower risk of opportunism.
The literature on partner selection has argued that partners’ inclination toward
opportunism becomes a key criterion for partner selection when partners’ behaviors are
difficult to observe and the outcomes of collaborations are highly unpredictable (Shah &
Swaminathan, 2008). Since technology cooperation typically entails such exchange
hazards (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pisano, 1989), firms strongly prefer partners with low
risk of opportunism for technology cooperation. Accordingly, as two potential partners
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have higher potential for mutual forbearance from opportunism, they are more likely to
partner with each other for technology cooperation. I therefore posit:
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of technology cooperation between two firms is
positively related to the degree of mutual forbearance potential
between them.

2.2.3

Contingent Effects of Mutual Forbearance Potential on Partner Selection

So far, I have argued that market overlap between two potential partners generates
mutual forbearance from opportunism, thereby making them attractive to each other as
partners for technology cooperation. However, the attractiveness of partners with market
overlap can vary depending on the hazards of opportunism the partners anticipate. That
is, when a potential technology partnership is expected to entail a higher level of
contractual hazards, firms will put more weight on prospective partners’ inclination
towards opportunism as a criterion for partner selection (Shah & Swaminathan 2008).
Under these conditions, partners with a higher potential for mutual forbearance from
opportunism will be even more preferred. By contrast, when opportunism is expected to
be lower, the mutual forbearance potential of market overlap would have a lesser impact
on partner selection for technology cooperation. Therefore, factors known to influence
the hazards of cooperation will also shape the effects of mutual forbearance potential on
partner selection.
The TCE literature emphasizes transaction attributes as determinants of
contractual hazards (Williamson, 1985). In particular, uncertainty has long been regarded
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as one of the major factors determining contractual hazards in the literature (Williamson,
1985). As the degree of uncertainty surrounding a transaction increases, it is more
difficult for the participating parties to write a complete and enforceable contract. Since
technological uncertainty is a key dimension of uncertainty in technology cooperation by
definition, I examine whether the mutual forbearance potential created by market overlap
will take on greater importance for technology partnerships with higher technological
uncertainty. In addition, research on technology cooperation has often emphasized the
vertical scope of agreements given the conceptual clarity of this transactional attribute as
well as data availability (Li et al., 2008; Oxley, 1997; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Phene &
Tallman, 2012; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). This research suggests that cooperative
agreements with a broader vertical scope entail a higher level of contractual hazards
compared to those with a narrower vertical scope. Therefore, I also investigate whether
the effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner selection will be intensified by the
vertical scope of technology cooperation.
Technological Uncertainty. The TCE literature has long suggested uncertainty as
one of the key transactional attributes determining the level of expected contractual
hazards (Williamson, 1985). As uncertainty increases, the occasions for sequential
adaptations increase in number and importance and accordingly contractual gaps also
enlarge, aggravating exchange hazards (Williamson, 1979). Technology cooperation
inevitably entails technological uncertainty due to the inherently uncertain nature of
innovative activities (Nelson & Winter, 1977). Technological uncertainty refers to “the
probability of improvements in technology; i.e. to new generations of technology which
might render obsolete the current technology development effort” and has tended to be
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regarded as an exogenous variable given by the area of interest (Robertson & Gatignon,
1998).
When technological uncertainty is high, it is difficult to understand involved
cause-effect relationships (Duncan, 1972) and to predict accurately the outcome of a
decision (Downey & Slocum, 1975). Therefore, when firms collaborate for the
development of a highly uncertain technology, they are likely to go through a series of
trials and errors and encounter various unexpected contingencies, which all make it
difficult to write a complete and enforceable contract ex ante. When contract-based
formal governance is not an effective means to reduce contractual hazards, firms can
mitigate the risks by selecting partners estimated to be low in inclination toward
opportunism. Accordingly, firms who have a high level of market overlap and thus are
likely to mutually forbear from opportunistic behaviors become more attractive to each
other as partners as the collaboration between them entail a higher level of technological
uncertainty. By contrast, when technological uncertainty in a technology cooperation
agreement is low, the joint effort can be effectively managed by formal contractual
apparatus and thus proclivity for opportunism might become less important as a criterion
for partner selection. Therefore, although the reduced risk of opportunism that mutual
forbearance between multimarket rivals causes is generally appreciated in searching for
partners for R&D activities, firms with a high level of market overlap are more preferred
as a partner for technology cooperation entailing a high level of technological uncertainty
compared to the case of low technological uncertainty. I therefore posit:
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Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner
selection is greater for technology cooperation entailing higher
technological uncertainty.

Vertical Scope of Technology Cooperation. Technology cooperation often
includes other downstream activities such as manufacturing and marketing. Research in
the field of technology and operations management has highlighted that firms can reduce
time-to-market and improve quality of new product introductions by having overlapping
activities and using cross-function teams (Loch & Terwiesch, 2000). Although this
argument concerns within-firm arrangements, the same logic can apply to interfirm
cooperation, leading to the conclusion that including manufacturing and/or marketing
functions in interfirm technology cooperation can provide the partners the same benefits
of reduced time-to-market and improved quality of new product introductions (Oxley &
Sampson, 2004).
However, such merits of collaborations entailing broad vertical scope do not come
without important drawbacks. Previous research has also emphasized that broad scope
collaborations can exacerbate the potential risk of opportunism and thus influence initial
governance choice and ex post governance changes. Pisano (1989) argued that when
transactions involve a broader range of products or technologies, equity-based
governance modes are more likely to be chosen. This is because involving multiple
projects aggravates contractual hazards by increasing the number of contingencies that
must be written into the initial contract and contributes to the possibility of unanticipated
contingencies arising during the course of relationship. Oxley (1997) also maintained that
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as a technology transfer alliance includes a broader range of products or technologies, the
difficulty and costs of monitoring activities inevitably increase, making involved firms
choose a more hierarchical governance structure. Consistent with the argument that it is
difficult to specify partners’ rights and obligations in broad-scope alliances, which entail
gaps that become evident during alliance implementation, Reuer and colleagues (2002)
report that alliances with broad scope are more likely to be renegotiated. Firms can also
contend with these same challenges during partner selection, prioritizing those partners
that come with less risk in the first place. Therefore, when firms search for partners for
technology cooperation of broader scope, they will prefer partners characterized by low
risk of opportunism to a larger extent. Thus, partners with a high level of mutual
forbearance potential will become more attractive as partners for technology cooperation
of broader scope. All else equal, for narrow-scope partnerships for which opportunism is
of lesser concern, the benefits of mutual forbearance potential will be lower. I therefore
posit:
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner
selection is greater for technology cooperation including
manufacturing or/and marketing than for pure technology
cooperation.
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2.3

2.3.1

Methods

Sample and Data

To test how mutual forbearance potential affects partner selection for technology
cooperation, I use the global biopharmaceutical industry as the empirical context of my
study. This industry is ideal for this purpose for two reasons. First, market definitions in
this industry are very clear. In this study, it is critical to define end-product markets to
make sure that firms defined as present in the same end-product market actually compete
with each other. The global biopharmaceutical industry is clearly classified into
therapeutic classes widely accepted by U.S. government authorities and industry
participants (e.g., cholesterol regulators, antiulcerants, and antipsychotics) (Anand et al.,
2009). Also, because drugs in the same therapeutic class are substitutes for each other in
most cases, the biopharmaceutical companies offering their products in the same
therapeutic class are direct competitors in the class. Second, this industry exhibits high
rates of technology cooperation (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002), and given the amount of
research carried out in this industry, my focus on this empirical context is valuable for
purposes of drawing comparisons across studies on the determinants of alliance
formation.
In order to examine firms’ activities in different markets, I rely on data provided
by IMS Health, a leading information provider in the biopharmaceutical industry that
collects prescription drug revenue data by therapeutic class for companies around the
world. I draw on the IMS Health data focusing on the top 200 prescription drug sales
companies in 2007, which occupied more than 90% of total global prescription drug sales
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in the year. For data on technology cooperation, I use the Thomson Reuters’ Recap
database. The Recap database compiles alliance information primarily from the filings of
biopharmaceutical companies with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A
recent analysis found the Recap database to be robust and representative in its coverage
of alliances in the global biopharmaceutical industry (Schilling, 2009), and it has been
used widely in the literature (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003;
Robinson & Stuart, 2007). In addition, I obtain patent data from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO).

2.3.2

Variables and Measurement

Dependent variable. I have three different dependent variables in this study. The
first dependent variable used to test H1 is Technology Cooperationijt taking the value of
one if firms i and j in a dyad form a technology cooperation agreement in year t, and zero
otherwise. The unit of analysis of this study is the dyad between two biopharmaceutical
firms. Prior studies have often analyzed cooperation between firms at the dyad level
(Gimeno, 2004; Gulati, 1995a; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Since the
biopharmaceutical industry is not characterized by alliance blocks, the usage of dyads as
the unit of analysis is further justified (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Regarded as equal
in a priori risk of forming a technology cooperation agreement, all the possible 19,900
dyads (=200C2) between the 200 firms are constructed and included in the alliance
opportunity risk set. They are also tracked from 2007 to 2013 to construct a panel. Since
the dependent variable is measured annually, it is also possible for two firms to form
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multiple agreements in the same year. There were nine such cases in my sample and I
included all of them as separate dyad-year observations, giving me in the final sample of
139,309 dyad-year observations.
To test H2, I developed Technological Uncertaintyijt, which takes three different
values: zero when firm i and firm j in a dyad do not form a technology cooperation
agreement in year t, one when the two firms enter into a technology cooperation
agreement including a low level of technological uncertainty, and two when the two firms
enter into a technology cooperation with a high level of technological uncertainty. To
distinguish low and high technological uncertainty, I used the estimates of the clinical
approval success rate by therapeutic categories that DiMasi, Feldman, Seckler, and
Wilson (2010) provide. I defined a technology agreement of which focal therapeutic class
has an above-the-mean clinical approval success rate as low technological uncertainty.
By contrast, when the focal therapeutic class of a technology cooperation has a belowthe-mean clinical approval success rate, the collaboration is defined as one with a high
level of technological uncertainty. This categorization is consistent with the definition of
technological uncertainty that I draw on in theory development: “the probability of
improvements in technology; i.e. to new generations of technology which might render
obsolete the current technology development effort (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998).”
Among the 147 technology cooperation agreements in the sample, 84 (57.1%) were
defined as low technological uncertainty while 63 (42.9%) high technological
uncertainty.
The third dependent variable used to test H3 is Vertical Scopeijt, a categorical
variable taking three different values. This variable takes one when firm i and firm j in a
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dyad do not enter into a technology cooperation agreement in year t, two when the two
firms form a technology-only cooperation (i.e., a cooperation that includes technologyrelated activities only), three when the two firms form a technology-plus cooperation
(i.e., a cooperation that involves manufacturing or/and marketing activities in addition to
technology-related activities). Out of the total 147 technology cooperation agreements in
the sample, 79 (53.7%) were defined as technology-only while 68 (46.3%) technologyplus.
Explanatory variables. To measure mutual forbearance potential between two
firms, I use the measure developed by Singal (1996). This measure has been regarded as
the most comprehensive measure of mutual forbearance potential because it takes into
account the major factors that have been demonstrated in the literature to affect mutual
forbearance potential (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Earlier, I argued that mutual forbearance
potential depends not only on the mere number of shared markets but also on some
features of the shared markets: strategic importance, asymmetry of strategic importance,
and the number of competitors. Singal’s (1996) measure for mutual forbearance potential
takes into account all these factors. That is, the measure basically counts the number of
market contacts, but weights each contact by (1) the size of the market, (2) the combined
market share of firm i and firm j in the market, (3) asymmetry of market presence of firm
i and firm j in the market, and (4) the number of firms in the market. Specifically, in the
measure provided below, strategic importance is reflected by the size of the market and
the combined market share. The measure accounts for asymmetry of strategic importance
by including the ratio of the market share of the larger firm to that of the smaller firm at
dyad-in-market level. Therefore, this measure increases as the strategic importance of the
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shared markets are dissimilar to each firm in a dyad. Lastly, it also takes into account the
number of firms by putting the number of possible contacts in a market (=nC2 where n
indicates the number of competitors in a market) as the denominator.
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Where, Ii(j)m: takes 1 if firm i(j) is present at a focal market m.
MSi(j)m: market share of firm i(j) in market m.
Nm: number of firms in market m.
Rm: total revenue in market m.
Rtotal: total revenue across all markets.
Since the unit of analysis in this study is a dyad, I aggregate MFPijm across the shared
markets to get MFPij (=∑

and use its value in a given year, MFPijt for each

dyad-year observation3.
Control variables. Following previous studies that modeled the formation of
collaboration agreements at the dyad level, I include various controls to avoid spurious
correlations. Firms that are larger or superior in resources tend to be more attractive
partners. As proxies for resource endowments that a firm can bring to an alliance, I use
the firm’s size (Gimeno, 2004), number of patents (DeCarolis, 2003; Matraves, 1999;
Roberts, 1999), and number of therapeutic classes in which it operates. At the same time,

In the multimarket competition literature, many different measures have been used to measure
multimarket contact and mutual forbearance, but there is no consensus on which measure is the best
(Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Since the measure developed by Singal (1996) is the most comprehensive and
complicated one, I also checked the results using the simplest, widely used measure that represents the ratio
of the number of market contact between two firms to the sum of the each firm’s number of markets (Baum
& Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006). When using this simplest measure, I obtained the qualitatively
same results as those from Singal’s (1996) measure for H1 and H2, but H3 was not supported.

3
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firms may want to partner with similar firms with respect to resource endowments.
Therefore, a pair of firms that are similar in the resource-related variables may be more
likely to enter into a cooperation agreement. To control for these effects, I include the
size of the larger firm of a dyad measured by annual prescription drug sales and the ratio
of sizes in the dyad (i.e., the ratio of the smaller firm’s sales to the larger firm’s sales)
(Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993; Gimeno, 2004). For intellectual resources, I also include the
number of patents by the firm with the most patents in the dyad as well as the ratio of
patent counts (i.e., the number of patents by the firm with less patents divided by the
prospective partner’s patents). In the same manner, the number of therapeutic classes of
the firm with more classes and the ratio of therapeutic classes are also included in the
model. Controlling for the number of therapeutic classes is important for another reason:
firms operating in many therapeutic classes may be more likely to be selected as
cooperation partners because of increased opportunities to partner given their diverse
operations.
Although the patent count measures above are included in the model to control for
the effects of the absolute and relative magnitudes of the firms’ intellectual property, the
relatedness of their knowledge base is a different, critical dimension to be considered
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001). If firms understand that they can be more innovative when they
find partners having knowledge overlap due to absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990), they may prefer prospective partners who have similar knowledge bases. For
example, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) examined the effect of dyadic technological
similarity on the likelihood of alliance formation in the biopharmaceutical industry,
measuring technological similarity by the cross-citation rate and common citation rate
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developed by Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996, 1998). Following their lead, I also
include in the model cross citation rate and common citation rate measured as follows:

where citations are accumulated from year t-6 to year t-1.
Some may expect that the effect of market overlap on partner selection might be
attributed to collusive purposes rather than reduced opportunism. More specifically, firms
may use R&D alliances as a communication channel to facilitate tacit collusion
(Vonortas, 2000). To control for this effect, I include the increment of market power
potential that two partners can achieve in the shared markets if they behave as one firm.
That is, I first calculate the normalized Herfindahl indexes in the shared markets and
average them with weights by market size. Then, assuming that the two firms behave as
one firm, I calculate a new weighted average of normalized Herfindahl indexes in the
shared markets. Finally, I include the difference between the two weighted averages to
obtain the increment of market power potential.
Cross-border technology cooperation may face some unique challenges stemming
from information asymmetry, difficulties in monitoring and enforcement, and different
institutional frameworks and cultures. Consistent with these observations, Hagedoorn
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(2002) found that international R&D alliances are less common than domestic
agreements, and the share of domestic R&D alliances has been increasing. To control for
this effect, I include a dummy variable, International Cooperation, which takes a value of
one if two firms in a dyad are headquartered in different countries, and zero otherwise.
Private firms and public firms may be different in terms of business processes and
procedures, as well as visibility to prospective partners, and these differences may affect
the likelihood of technology cooperation (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). I therefore
accounted for these possibilities by using two dummy variables, Private (max) and
Private (min). The former (latter) takes one if the bigger (smaller) firm in a dyad is a
private firm and zero otherwise. Lastly, year dummy variables are included in the model
to control for macroeconomic or other factors influencing the propensity for the
formation of technology cooperation in different years.

2.3.3

Statistical Methods

Given that the dependent variable for H1, Technology Cooperationijt, is a binary
variable, I use a probit model as my base model. In addition, to avoid any potential
effects of non-independent observations I also use robust estimation of standard errors
using the Huber-White sandwich estimator (White, 1980). H2 compares the effects of
mutual forbearance potential on partner selection for technology-only cooperation versus
technology-plus cooperation while H3 for technology cooperation with a low level of
technological uncertainty versus that with a high level of technological uncertainty.
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Therefore, for testing H2 and H3 I use multinomial logit models with robust standard
errors, taking non-realized deal as the omitted category4.
For robustness analyses, I use three methods in addition to the standard models: a
random-effects model, a penalized maximum likelihood estimation method (i.e., Firth’s
logit model), and analysis using a different definition of technology cooperation. First,
although I seek to capture as much variation in the dependent variables as possible with
controls that are featured in prior studies, there is still a risk of unobserved heterogeneity
among the dyads in the model. Therefore, I use random-effects models (i.e., randomeffects probit models for H1and random-effect multinomial models for H2 and H3) to
mitigate this concern following prior studies on dyad-level alliance formation (Gimeno,
2004; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014).
Second, the usual maximum likelihood estimation, which is used in a standard
probit model, can be biased when the count of rare events is small (Cosslett, 1981;
Imbens, 1992; Lancaster & Imbens, 1996). Since there are 146 realized technology
cooperation agreements in my sample, I use Firth’s logit model using the penalized
likelihood method for H1 where the model is applicable (Firth, 1993). This penalized
likelihood method is a widely accepted, general approach to reducing small-sample bias.
Lastly, I test my hypotheses again treating licensing agreements as non-realized
technology cooperation. In my main results, licensing agreements are also treated as

When I conducted Hausman chi-squared tests of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), I found no
support for rejecting the null hypotheses that odds are independent of other alternatives for both
technological uncertainty and vertical scope (for technological uncertainty, chi-sqaure (20)=10.4 and
p=0.960 for non-realized deal, 11.3 and 0.939 for low technological uncertainty, and 9.9 and 0.969 for high
technological uncertainty; for vertical scope, chi-sqaure (20)=21.4 and p=0.372 for non-realized deal, 13.0
and 0.876 for technology-only cooperation, and 10.1 and 0.966 for technology-plus cooperation).
Therefore, my usage of multinomial logit models for testing H2 and H3 was corroborated.

4
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technology cooperation because licensing agreements involve transfer of technology and
also confront greater transactional hazards relative to other unilateral agreements such as
supply and distribution agreements. Somaya, Kim, and Vonortas (2011) highlighted that
licensing has some critical alliance-like features. Rather than selling their intellectual
property indiscriminately, licensors often use licensing agreements to access the
complementary assets that licensees possess. Furthermore, this tendency is particularly
salient in the biopharmaceutical industry which is my empirical setting (Somaya et al.,
2011). When licensors are dependent on licensees’ complementary assets, the former are
exposed to significant risks because the latter “may devote inadequate complementary
resources, or learn from the licensor and then commercialize its own technology, or their
priorities may change over time, or it may simple be less capable than initially thought”
(Somaya et al., 2011: 161). At the same time, licensees also may confront transactional
hazards due to the uncertainty that early stage technology entails or if they are required to
make the license-specific investments. Despite these unique features of licensing
agreements, however, some may argue that unilateral agreements such as licensing
agreements are inherently different from bilateral technology collaborations in terms of
the potential risk involved. For example, Pisano (1989) argued that parties can delineate
property rights at the outset with far less ambiguity in licensing agreements compared to
other bilateral transactions. To mitigate this concern, I re-ran the models by excluding
licensing agreements and focusing on other forms of technology cooperation, in order to
determine if the inclusion or exclusion of licensing agreements influenced my results and
interpretations.
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2.4

Results

Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables
used in the analyses. The correlation between Mutual Forbearance Potential and
Technology Cooperation is positive and significant offering preliminary support for my
theory. Though there are many significant pairwise correlations, my models do not
present multicollinearity concerns. Individual variance inflation factors (VIF) for the
independent variables are all below the recommended cutoff levels of 10 (the maximum
value was 5.35 for International Deal) and the mean value is 1.66 (Neter, Kutner,
Nachtsheim, & Wasseman, 1996).
Table 2.2 reports the main results of this study based on probit and multinomial
logit models examining how mutual forbearance potential between two prospective
partners affect the likelihood that they will partner each other for technology cooperation
(H1) and when this relationship is more or less pronounced (H2 and H3). Model 1 in
Table 2.2 contains the control variables only. Some estimation results for several control
variables deserve mention. While the coefficient of Size (Max) is positive and significant,
that of Ratio of Size (small firm to large firm) is positive and insignificant, meaning that
although larger firms are significantly preferred as partners for technology cooperation,
the preference for partners of similar size is not significant. These results are partially
consistent with previous work that reported positive and significant coefficients for both
(Gimeno, 2004). Positive and significant coefficients are estimated for both Common
Citation Rate and Cross-citation Rate (e.g., Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). The coefficient
of Increment of H-index is also positive and significant, suggesting that two firms who
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables
(1) Technology Cooperation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

1

(2) Technological Uncertainty

0.945

1

(3) Vertical Scope

0.946

0.911

1

(4) Mutual Forbearance Potential

0.073

0.094

0.091

1

(5) Size (Max)

0.045

0.043

0.043

0.06

1

(6) Ratio of Size

-0.007

-0.007

-0.008

-0.016

-0.478

1

(7) Patent Count (Max)

0.028

0.026

0.028

0.057

0.531

-0.269

1

(8) Ratio of Patent Count

-0.002

-0.001

-0.002

-0.007

-0.2

0.2

-0.234

1

(9) Class Count (Max)

0.023

0.021

0.022

0.033

0.471

-0.263

0.23

-0.053

1

(10) Ratio of Class Count

0.006

0.007

0.006

0.013

-0.036

0.068

-0.015

0.032

-0.165

1

(11) Common Citation Rate

0.026

0.029

0.024

0.013

0.087

-0.03

0.106

-0.016

0.047

0

(12) Cross-citation Rate

0.019

0.024

0.024

0.006

0.035

-0.01

0.046

-0.003

0.022

-0.003

0.194

1

(13) Increment of H-index

0.066

0.065

0.055

0.056

0.306

0.003

0.191

-0.007

0.168

0.043

0.077

0.032

1

(14) International Deal

-0.018

-0.016

-0.014

-0.001

-0.011

0.004

-0.024

0.02

0.092

-0.001

-0.014

-0.002

-0.042

1

(15) Private (Bigger Firm)

-0.014

-0.012

-0.014

-0.018

-0.267

0.249

-0.218

0.209

-0.11

0.045

-0.037

-0.014

-0.072

0.055

1

(16) Private (Smaller Firm)

-0.022

-0.02

-0.02

-0.006

-0.061

-0.043

-0.07

0.04

-0.041

0.035

-0.035

-0.005

-0.07

0.046

0.023

1

Mean

0.001

1.002

1.002

0

6.04

0.375

53.55

0.3

116.86

0.434

0.001

0

0

0.911

0.31

0.47

S.D.

0.032

0.049

0.05

0

10.677

0.293

123.11

0.416

59.98

0.28

0.009

0.002

0

0.285

0.462

0.499

Min

0

1

1

0

0.038

0

0

0

1

0.004

0

0

0

0

0

0

Max

1

3

3

0.001

61.767

1

1128

1

279

1

1

0.408

0.012

1

1

1

1

Note: N=139,309. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at least at 0.05 level.
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can achieve a greater increment of market power by coordinating as one firm are more
likely to partner each other, which is consistent with Vonortas (2000). A negative and
significant coefficient is estimated for International Deal, which is consistent with
Hagedoorn's (2002) observation of the dominance of R&D partnering in the same
regions, especially in biopharmaceuticals. The coefficients of Private (Max) and Private
(Min) both are negative and significant, which means that firms prefer partnering public
firms.
Model 2 in Table 2.2 includes Mutual Forbearance Potential in addition to the
control variables to test H1. Since the coefficient of Mutual Forbearance Potential is
positive and significant (b=0.014 and p<0.05), H1 is supported: as two potential partners
have a greater level of mutual forbearance potential, they are more likely to select each
other as partners for technology cooperation. I calculated the marginal effects of each
observation and averaged the responses (Hoetker, 2007). As the value of Mutual
Forbearance Potential moves from the mean to one and two standard deviation from the
mean, the likelihood of technology cooperation increases by 4.2 and 8.6 percent
respectively5.
H2 predicts that the positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner
selection is larger for technology cooperation agreements entailing high technological
uncertainty relative to those with low technological uncertainty. In Model 3 and 4,
multinomial logit models are employed to compare how different the effects of mutual

When I used Baum and Korn's (1996) measure that represents the ratio of the number of market contact
between two firms to the sum of the each firm’s number of markets, the estimated economic significance
was substantially larger than that based on Singal’s (1996) measure. When the value of Baum and Korn’s
(1996) measure moves from the mean to one and two standard deviation from the mean, the probability of
technology cooperation increases by 72 and 189 percent.
5
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forbearance potential on the formation of technology cooperation are depending on the
level of technological uncertainty. The coefficients for Mutual Forbearance Potential in
Model 3 and 4 are both positive and significant (b=0.017 and p<0.05; b=0.031 and
p<0.01). However, the Wald test shows that the coefficient in Model 4 is significantly
larger than that in Model 3 (Chi-square (1)=5.16 and p=0.023), supporting H2.
H3 states that the tendency for firms to prefer prospective alliance partners with a
high level of mutual forbearance potential is more likely when they search for partners
for technology partnerships that involve collaboration in other functional activities at the
same time (i.e., technology cooperation including manufacturing or/and marketing
activities) rather than technology-only cooperation. Model 5 and 6 use multinomial logit
models having no deal as the omitted category. While Model 5 estimates the formation of
technology-only cooperation, Model 6 is for technology-plus cooperation. The
coefficients of Mutual Forbearance Potential are all positive and significant in Model 5
and 6 (b=0.018 and p<0.05; b=0.031 and p<0.001). Moreover, the coefficient in Model 6
is larger than that in Model 5 and the two values are significantly different at 5 percent
level as the Wald test reveals (Chi-square (1)=4.15 and p=0.042). Therefore, the
preference for partners with a high level of mutual forbearance potential is stronger when
firms search for partners for technology cooperation of broader vertical scope, supporting
H3.
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Table 2.2. Main Results (Probit and Multinomial Logit Models)
Model
(2)
Probit
Tech.
Dependent Variable
cooperation
Hypothesis tested
H1
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.014***
(0.002)
Size (Max)
0.132***
0.131***
(0.025)
(0.025)
Ratio of Size
0.033
0.031
(0.035)
(0.035)
Patent Count (Max)
0.040*
0.035
(0.022)
(0.023)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.037
0.033
(0.028)
(0.028)
Class Count (Max)
0.065**
0.066**
(0.028)
(0.028)
Ratio of Class Count
0.070**
0.066**
(0.027)
(0.027)
Common Citation Rate
0.018***
0.018***
(0.006)
(0.006)
Cross-citation Rate
0.013***
0.013***
(0.005)
(0.005)
Increment of H-index
0.023***
0.023***
(0.007)
(0.007)
International Deal
-0.340***
-0.343***
(0.068)
(0.068)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-0.168**
-0.166**
(0.083)
(0.083)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-0.448***
-0.446***
(0.072)
(0.072)
Constant
-2.856***
-2.869***
(0.101)
(0.103)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Wald Chi-square (df)
380.09*** (18)
428.55*** (19)
Pseudo R-square
0.129
0.133
Log Pseudolikelihood
-1006.12
-1001.02
Number of Observations
139,309
139,309
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the continuous variables above are standardized for better
presentation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
Model Specification

(1)
Probit
Tech.
cooperation
H1
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Table 2.2. Continued
Model
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Multinomial
Multinomial
Multinomial
Multinomial
Model Specification
logit
logit
logit
logit
Low tech.
High tech.
uncertainty
uncertainty
Tech.-only
Tech.-plus
Dependent Variable
vs. no deal
vs. no deal
vs. no deal
vs. no deal
Hypothesis tested
H2
H2
H3
H3
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.017**
0.031***
0.018**
0.031***
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.005)
Size (Max)
0.322***
0.548***
0.407***
0.431***
(0.096)
(0.117)
(0.107)
(0.101)
Ratio of Size
0.097
0.137
0.114
0.127
(0.155)
(0.168)
(0.163)
(0.157)
Patent Count (Max)
0.176*
0.015
0.136
0.084
(0.091)
(0.100)
(0.092)
(0.101)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.115
0.164
0.124
0.163
(0.123)
(0.143)
(0.125)
(0.140)
Class Count (Max)
0.270**
0.108
0.115
0.318**
(0.119)
(0.136)
(0.125)
(0.128)
Ratio of Class Count
0.201*
0.290**
0.167
0.335***
(0.121)
(0.124)
(0.120)
(0.126)
Common Citation Rate
0.026*
0.044***
0.038***
0.033*
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.020)
Cross-citation Rate
0.000
0.040***
-0.005
0.038***
(0.041)
(0.011)
(0.059)
(0.010)
Increment of H-index
0.028
0.038*
0.049***
-0.001
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.017)
(0.027)
International Deal
-1.180***
-0.839**
-1.262***
-0.732**
(0.262)
(0.340)
(0.275)
(0.332)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-1.319***
-0.048
-0.458
-0.897*
(0.495)
(0.381)
(0.378)
(0.458)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-1.726***
-1.290***
-1.921***
-1.189***
(0.358)
(0.356)
(0.398)
(0.331)
Constant
-6.741***
-7.099***
-6.850***
-7.000***
(0.452)
(0.481)
(0.488)
(0.458)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Included
Included
H2/H3: Chi-square (1)
5.16**
4.15**
Wald Chi-square (df)
626.46*** (38)
601.05*** (38)
Pseudo R-square
0.130
0.128
Log Pseudolikelihood
-1092.14
-1095.55
Number of Observations
139,309
139,309
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the continuous variables above are standardized for better
presentation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
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2.4.1

Supplemental Analyses

Table 2.3 shows the results from logit models using penalized likelihood
estimation (so-called Firth logit models) to control for rare event bias (Firth, 1993). As
shown in Model 2, the positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on the likelihood of
technology cooperation being formed is still supported (b=0.021 and p<0.01).
I also re-tested all the hypotheses using random-effects specifications to control
for unobservable heterogeneity. As shown in Table 2.4, random-effects probit models and
random-effects multinomial logit models were employed. Although random-effects were
significant in all the models, the results were consistent with the main results in Table
2.2.
Finally, since licensing agreements can be less prone to contractual hazards
compared to other types of technology collaborations, I examined whether the findings
are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these agreements and the results are shown
in Table 2.5. Treating licensing agreements as non-realized deals and using random
effects models, the estimation results are consistent with the main results in Table 2.2. It
therefore appears that consideration of the small number of realized deals among
potential transactions, unobserved heterogeneity, and forms of technology cooperation
lead to the interpretations consistent with those presented earlier.
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Table 2.3. Penalized Likelihood Estimation Results (Firth Logit Models)
Model
(1)
(2)
Variables
Tech. Cooperation
Tech. Cooperation
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.021***
(0.006)
Size (Max)
0.412***
0.409***
(0.076)
(0.076)
Ratio of Size
0.118
0.114
(0.107)
(0.108)
Patent Count (Max)
0.122*
0.111*
(0.062)
(0.064)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.152
0.139
(0.103)
(0.104)
Class Count (Max)
0.202**
0.207**
(0.097)
(0.097)
Ratio of Class Count
0.250***
0.239***
(0.083)
(0.084)
Common Citation Rate
0.038***
0.038***
(0.012)
(0.012)
Cross-citation Rate
0.039***
0.039***
(0.009)
(0.009)
Increment of H-index
0.032*
0.033*
(0.018)
(0.018)
International Deal
-1.042***
-1.055***
(0.200)
(0.200)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-0.633**
-0.621**
(0.282)
(0.282)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-1.500***
-1.494***
(0.247)
(0.247)
Constant
-5.692***
-5.687***
(0.284)
(0.284)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Wald Chi-square (df)
376.92*** (18)
390.31*** (19)
Penalized Log Likelihood
-966.3
-956.6
Number of Observations
139,309
139,309
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the continuous variables above are standardized for better
presentation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.4. Random-effects Probit and Multinomial Logit Results
Model
(1)
(2)
Random-effects
Random-effects
Model specification
probit
probit
Dependent Variable
Tech. Cooperation
Tech. Cooperation
Hypothesis tested
H1
H1
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.014***
(0.002)
Size (Max)
0.159***
0.158***
(0.035)
(0.034)
Ratio of Size
0.057
0.055
(0.046)
(0.046)
Patent Count (Max)
0.055**
0.051*
(0.027)
(0.028)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.041
0.038
(0.038)
(0.038)
Class Count (Max)
0.095**
0.094**
(0.039)
(0.038)
Ratio of Class Count
0.076**
0.072**
(0.037)
(0.036)
Common Citation Rate
0.024***
0.024***
(0.009)
(0.009)
Cross-citation Rate
0.014*
0.014*
(0.008)
(0.008)
Increment of H-index
0.030***
0.030***
(0.011)
(0.011)
International Deal
-0.451***
-0.449***
(0.096)
(0.096)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-0.258**
-0.253**
(0.117)
(0.116)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-0.526***
-0.520***
(0.100)
(0.099)
Constant
-3.583***
-3.571***
(0.203)
(0.207)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Rho
0.367***
0.356***
(0.055)
(0.057)
Wald Chi-square (df)
158.45*** (18)
162.22*** (19)
Log Pseudolikelihood
-944.04
-940.79
Number of Observations
139,300
139,300
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when
there are more than one observation, reducing the same size from 139,309 to 139,300.
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Table 2.4. Continued
Model
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RandomRandomRandomRandomeffects
effects
effects
effects
multinomial multinomial multinomial multinomial
Model specification
logit
logit
logit
logit
Low tech.
High tech. Tech.-only Tech.-plus
uncertainty uncertainty vs. no deal vs. no deal
Dependent Variable
vs. no deal vs. no deal
Hypothesis tested
H2
H2
H3
H3
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.018**
0.031***
0.019**
0.030***
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.004)
Size (Max)
0.320***
0.555***
0.393***
0.445***
(0.108)
(0.137)
(0.120)
(0.117)
Ratio of Size
0.111
0.190
0.130
0.171
(0.159)
(0.176)
(0.169)
(0.173)
Patent Count (Max)
0.200**
0.039
0.154*
0.111
(0.097)
(0.096)
(0.091)
(0.103)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.101
0.147
0.109
0.146
(0.136)
(0.152)
(0.129)
(0.152)
Class Count (Max)
0.309**
0.175
0.151
0.386***
(0.130)
(0.157)
(0.135)
(0.144)
Ratio of Class Count
0.149
0.254*
0.107
0.304**
(0.129)
(0.135)
(0.130)
(0.134)
Common Citation Rate
0.043*
0.060***
0.058***
0.047*
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.022)
(0.026)
Cross-citation Rate
-0.013
0.039**
-0.025
0.038**
(0.056)
(0.019)
(0.105)
(0.017)
Increment of H-index
0.056*
0.062**
0.084***
0.011
(0.032)
(0.029)
(0.033)
(0.036)
International Deal
-1.307***
-0.988*** -1.423***
-0.843**
(0.292)
(0.352)
(0.291)
(0.356)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-1.340**
-0.137
-0.480
-1.061**
(0.582)
(0.444)
(0.420)
(0.490)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-1.711***
-1.205*** -1.876***
-1.136***
(0.367)
(0.366)
(0.405)
(0.341)
Constant
-8.475***
-8.808*** -8.583***
-8.751***
(0.634)
(0.650)
(0.681)
(0.611)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Included
Included
Variance(Random Effect)
3.580*** (0.831)
3.610*** (0.820)
H2/H3: Chi-square (1)
5.81**
3.98**
Log Pseudolikelihood
-1027.72
-1030.74
Number of Observations
139,300
139,300
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when
there are more than one observation, reducing the same size from 139,309 to 139,300.
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Table 2.5. Random-effects Probit/Multinomial Logit Results Excluding Licensing
Agreements
Model
(1)
(2)
Random-effects
Random-effects
Model specification
probit
probit
Dependent Variable
Tech. Cooperation Tech. Cooperation
Hypothesis tested
H1
H1
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.016***
(0.002)
Size (Max)
0.280***
0.277***
(0.055)
(0.055)
Ratio of Size
0.168***
0.164***
(0.064)
(0.063)
Patent Count (Max)
-0.016
-0.030
(0.041)
(0.043)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.160***
0.151***
(0.056)
(0.054)
Class Count (Max)
0.021
0.020
(0.060)
(0.059)
Ratio of Class Count
0.019
0.010
(0.054)
(0.052)
Common Citation Rate
0.023**
0.022**
(0.009)
(0.009)
Cross-citation Rate
0.007
0.007
(0.006)
(0.006)
Increment of H-index
0.019
0.019
(0.012)
(0.012)
International Deal
-0.274*
-0.271**
(0.141)
(0.138)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-0.498**
-0.479**
(0.196)
(0.189)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-0.385***
-0.374***
(0.145)
(0.142)
Constant
-4.139***
-4.086***
(0.377)
(0.392)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Rho
0.421***
0.397***
(.091)
(0.099)
Wald Chi-square (df)
68.53*** (18)
71.90*** (19)
Log Pseudolikelihood
-422.11
-418.39
Number of Observations
139,300
139,300
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when
there are more than one observation, reducing the same size from 139,309 to 139,300.
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Table 2.5 Continued
Model
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RandomRandomRandomRandomeffects
effects
effects
effects
multinomial multinomial multinomial multinomial
Model specification
logit
logit
logit
logit
Low tech.
High tech.
Tech.-only
Tech.-plus
uncertainty uncertainty vs. no deal
vs. no deal
Dependent Variable
vs. no deal
vs. no deal
Hypothesis tested
H2
H2
H3
H3
Mutual Forbearance Potential
0.020*
0.041***
0.023**
0.037***
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.007)
Size (Max)
0.579***
1.135***
0.706***
0.842***
(0.154)
(0.216)
(0.179)
(0.182)
Ratio of Size
0.445**
0.516*
0.491**
0.437
(0.202)
(0.302)
(0.213)
(0.313)
Patent Count (Max)
-0.063
-0.115
-0.107
-0.022
(0.129)
(0.202)
(0.169)
(0.141)
Ratio of Patent Count
0.430**
0.488**
0.392**
0.551**
(0.178)
(0.232)
(0.181)
(0.216)
Class Count (Max)
0.329
-0.443*
0.051
0.090
(0.207)
(0.237)
(0.207)
(0.279)
Ratio of Class Count
0.213
-0.252
0.160
-0.127
(0.160)
(0.262)
(0.167)
(0.247)
Common Citation Rate
0.052**
0.037
0.067***
0.004
(0.021)
(0.024)
(0.021)
(0.031)
Cross-citation Rate
0.020
0.015
0.019
0.021*
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.023)
(0.011)
Increment of H-index
0.034
0.028
0.062*
-0.071
(0.036)
(0.038)
(0.035)
(0.061)
International Deal
-0.644
-0.840
-0.937**
-0.340
(0.462)
(0.543)
(0.444)
(0.602)
Private (Bigger Firm)
-19.831***
0.036
-1.387*
-1.298*
(0.271)
(0.712)
(0.708)
(0.705)
Private (Smaller Firm)
-1.276**
-0.939
-1.222**
-1.063*
(0.502)
(0.600)
(0.507)
(0.590)
Constant
-9.532***
-10.926*** -10.038*** -10.312***
(0.958)
(1.355)
(1.075)
(1.283)
Year Fixed Effects
Included
Included
Included
Included
Variance(Random Effect)
4.292*** (1.680)
4.478*** (1.796)
H2/H3: Chi-square (1)
8.36***
4.11**
Log Pseudolikelihood
-443.48
-442.63
Number of Observations
139,300
139,300
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when
there are more than one observation, reducing the same size from 139,309 to 139,300.

45
2.5

2.5.1

Discussion

Contributions and Implications

This paper makes several theoretical contributions to the alliance literature in
general and the specific stream of research on partner selection in particular. First, at the
broadest level, my theory and results offer new interpretations and implications for
market overlap and interfirm collaborations. As Gulati (1999: 397) has argued, in the
alliance literature “the primary focus has been on understanding some of the resourcebased considerations that promote the formation of alliances.” In particular, drawing on
the resource-based view (or resource dependence theory) and population ecology, the
alliance literature has typically argued that market overlap between potential partners
makes collaborations between them unlikely. This is because firms competing in the
same market niches are similar in terms of resources and capabilities (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977) and this lack of complementarity reduces their strategic interdependence
and, in turn, motivation to cooperate (Richardson, 1972). Along similar lines, previous
studies in the alliance literature have often measured complementarity between firms by
counting non-overlapping niches and also have tested the negative effect of market (or
niche) overlap on collaborations (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995a; Rothaermel &
Boeker, 2008).
However, by aiming to bridge the literatures on multimarket competition and
interfirm collaboration, I offer a new theoretical logic for the linkage between market
overlap and partner selection. I have demonstrated that market overlap can facilitate
technology cooperation and have identified a new mechanism for why partners can find

46
cooperative agreements with rivals attractive: market overlap generates mutual
forbearance from opportunism. Although my new arguments and the conventional view
make the opposite predictions about the relationship between market overlap and
technology cooperation, I see the different perspectives as being complementary rather
than incompatible with each other. They consider different theoretical mechanisms
shaping the attractiveness of partners (i.e., based on resource/capability endowments and
likelihood of opportunism), so the positive and negative effects of market overlap can coexist in theory. Furthermore, recent work on partner selection in the alliance literature
highlights that the relative importance of criteria for partner selection such as resource
complementarity and the risk of opportunism varies depending on alliance context. For
example, Shah and Swaminathan (2008) argued that when “outcome interpretability” and
“process manageability” are both low, trust becomes a key criterion for partner selection.
Because my theory and results are based on technology cooperation where outcome
interpretability and process manageability both are low, this can explain the net positive
effect of market overlap for the technology partnerships I study. It would be valuable in
future research to identify specific conditions under which market overlap has a negative
effect on technology cooperation based upon resource considerations rather than mutual
forbearance potential. Such research holds the potential to determine the importance of
the new motive for partner selection I have identified compared to other criteria that
prospective collaborators employ (Ariño & Ring, 2010; Gimeno, 2004; Hitt et al., 2004;
Li et al., 2008; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014; Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008).
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Second, my theoretical arguments for market overlap and the risk of opportunism
enrich the conventional view on the competitive aspect of cooperation by considering the
cost side of opportunistic behaviors in partnerships. The literature has mainly argued that
competitive relationships in end-product markets aggravate hazards of cooperation by
increasing the benefit to a firm engaging in opportunism (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park
& Russo, 1996). Above all, opportunistic behaviors in a partnership with an end-product
market rival can directly hurt the rival in a zero-sum game. In addition, although perfect
cooperation within the partnership may make the goal of the partnership more likely to be
achieved, the outcomes by perfect cooperation within the partnership improve the
competitiveness of the rivals equally, which decreases the incentive for perfect
cooperation relative to opportunistic action (Khanna et al., 1998). In addition to this
conventional view focusing on the immediate pay-off from opportunistic behavior, I
suggest that it is also valuable to consider the multi-period consequences of initial
opportunism, including the responses by the counterpart in the markets in which the firms
compete. If a partner can retaliate against opportunistic action of a firm in multiple
markets, the cost of the initial opportunistic action will increase, making the net benefit
unclear once such costs are considered. By applying this simple idea from the
multimarket competition literature to the partnership context, I suggest that the effects of
competition between partners outside an alliance on behavior within an alliance is more
complicated than previously considered in the alliance literature.
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2.5.2

Limitations and Future Research Directions

This study also has a number of specific limitations that extensions to this
research might address. To begin with, my study considers technology cooperation in
biopharmaceuticals, so it would be interesting to investigate other forms of collaborative
agreements in other industry contexts to probe the generalizability of my findings. Such
research could be valuable to ascertain the importance of market overlap and mutual
forbearance from opportunism relative to other partner selection criteria in other
collaborative contexts.
Along similar lines, it is important to note that the market domain of a firm is
defined by two theoretical dimensions—the product market dimension and geographical
dimension (Jayachandran et al., 1999). Therefore, strictly speaking, multimarket contact
should be measured taking the two dimensions into account simultaneously. Due to data
limitations to do both at once, this paper considers the product market dimension only
and thus the results of this paper would be weakened if the sample firms are not
overlapping in their geographical market domains. To mitigate this concern, based on
interviews with industry experts, I have focused on the top 200 global firms in
biopharmaceuticals as these firms sell their products in major foreign countries and have
the financial wherewithal to bear the cost of going through expensive approval
procedures in foreign countries. It would therefore be valuable to investigate
heterogeneity in firms’ geographic markets to consider this potential boundary condition
for mutual forbearance in promoting technology cooperation.
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Moreover, future research might investigate how overlap in end-product markets
interacts with overlap in factor markets to influence mutual forbearance and partner
selection for cooperation. Since factor market overlap between two firms may imply
resource similarity between them, the resource complementarity view might predict that
factor market overlap will demotivate partnerships between them. By contrast,
Jayachandran and colleagues (1999) argued that resource similarity facilitates a
cooperative arrangement, such as mutual forbearance, by increasing the credibility of
retaliation expectations. Later, Markman and colleagues (2009) also claimed that when
two firms are highly overlapped both in end-product markets and factor markets, their
awareness of the benefit from and motivation for mutual forbearance are both the highest.
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate which effect is more salient under what
conditions.
Given that I only consider partner selection in the current study, it would be natural and
interesting extension of this study to investigate how the mutual forbearance from
opportunism between multimarket rivals affects other collaboration-related decisions and
outcomes. There are many opportunities to bring the multimarket competition literature
into different streams of research on alliances. For instance, future studies might examine
how mutual forbearance potential and firms’ cooperative history jointly have an impact
on governance choices, alliance design, conflicts between partners, and knowledge
transfers or other outcomes of interfirm collaborations. It would be interesting to consider
whether multimarket rivals design incentives and administrative controls in collaborative
agreements differently from other partners, given the shadow of the future cast on such
collaborations. It might also be that such collaborations are subject to different dynamics
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than other alliances not embedded in a competitive context offering the potential for
mutual forbearance from opportunism. Such research could examine whether and how
firms retaliate against opportunism in alliances in their shared markets and vice-versa.
Finally, my study has only examined the formation phase of alliances and is silent on the
execution of technology partnerships as well as the performance consequences of
alliances formed between multimarket rivals. Therefore, future research might examine
whether the success or failure of collaborations (Park & Russo, 1996) or the intended
transfer of (or unintended leakage of ) know-how (Oxley & Wada, 2009) in technology
partnerships are apt to be affected by mutual forbearance from opportunism. Many
opportunities therefore exist to examine the interplay of collaboration and multimarket
competition to build upon this study as a first step in joining these literatures.
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CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF MULTIMARKET CONTACT ON THE GOVERNANCE
OF R&D ALLIANCES

3.1

Introduction

In the alliance literature, governance structure choice has been regarded as one of
the most important decisions that firms have to undertake for their collaborative
agreements (Li et al., 2008). Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been a primary
theoretical foundation in the literature on alliance governance. At the same time,
however, its exclusive focus on transactional attributes and related contractual hazards as
determinants of governance structures has been criticized by scholars who emphasize that
the broader social context in which a transaction is embedded also crucially influences
governance choice (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Jones, Hesterly, &
Borgatti, 1997). In particular, the stream of research on relational embeddedness has
showed that in general previous cooperative relationships between alliance partners
mitigate the risk of opportunism by partners and thus reduce the need for hierarchical
governance structures for their collaborations (Gulati, 1995b).
It is noteworthy that the alliance governance literature has not achieved
comparable progress regarding how competitive relationships between alliance partners
influence the decisions concerning alliances and their governance. This is an important
research gap because the competitive relationships a firm has with its potential partners—
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both in product markets as well as in factor markets—are among the most important
contextual conditions that firms consider for their collaborations. Furthermore, I know
little about how these different types of dyadic relationships that alliance partners have
outside an alliance (i.e., competitive relationships in product and factor markets and other
cooperative relationships) jointly affect the governance of alliances. Indeed, some
previous work, though scant, has addressed competition between alliance partners and the
competitive context of inter-firm collaboration (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000;
Hamel et al., 1989; Khanna et al., 1998). However, this research has not focused upon
how different competitive relationships between alliance partners might affect alliance
governance. More importantly, previous research has emphasized that market overlap
between alliance partners incentivizes them to behave opportunistically by increasing the
pay-off from such behavior (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996). However,
based on the multimarket competition literature, I can build upon and extend this
argument by taking into account possible future competitive responses by alliance
partners and therefore the consequential costs of behaving opportunistically.
The multimarket competition literature has theorized and corroborated that as two
firms encounter each other in more markets, or have a higher level of multimarket
contact,6 they mutually forbear from competitive attacks for fear of broad retaliation by
the attacked firm across the multiple shared markets (Baum & Korn, 1996; Evans &
Kessides, 1994; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Phillips &
Mason, 1996). Accordingly, in R&D alliances featuring concerns about opportunism by

6

In this paper, I use the terms market overlap, (multi)market contact, and shared markets interchangeably.
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partners (Pisano, 1989), multimarket contact between partner firms might also curb
opportunistic behavior, since opportunism is also a form of competitive action to
appropriate value in an R&D collaboration. For this reason, shared markets between
R&D partners can enhance incentive alignment, thus making the R&D alliance less likely
to be governed by hierarchical governance structures that the alliance governance
literature has long suggested as remedies for opportunism.
Furthermore, I also pay attention to other types of dyadic relationships alliance
partners have outside an alliance in addition to rivalry in end-product markets. Alliance
partners may encounter each other not only in end-product markets, but also in factor
markets. In addition, they may be embedded in prior cooperative relationships, so there is
an opportunity to consider the competitive and cooperative context of an alliance
agreement at the same time. Drawing on the multimarket competition literature on factor
market rivalry and the literature on relational embeddedness respectively, I claim that
competition in factor markets intensifies the mutual forbearance from opportunism that
multimarket contact in end-product markets generates. I also develop the theoretical
argument that there is a substituting relationship between previous cooperative
experience and multimarket contact in determining the expected level of opportunism by
partners.
By theorizing upon how different dyadic relationships located outside an alliance
affect incentive alignment and governance choice, I make several contributions to
research on alliance governance as well as to the multimarket competition literature.
Beyond joining these two streams of research that have previously developed separately,
I contribute to the literature on the competitive aspects of collaborations by suggesting
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that overlap across markets can reduce the risk of opportunism by increasing its cost. My
study therefore offers a novel and more complete perspective on how the competitive
context of collaboration affects alliance governance choice. My theory emphasizes that
competition does not always undermine cooperation. Also, my theory and results
contribute to an understanding of how three different dyadic relationships between
alliance partners, i.e., end-product market rivalry, factor market rivalry, and prior
collaborative relationships, interplay with one another in influencing partners’ alliance
governance choices.
I also contribute to the multimarket competition literature by proposing that
market contact can influence firms’ decisions through efficiency considerations, rather
than market power considerations. Previous studies on multimarket competition have
interpreted mutual forbearance as tacit collusion, which enables firms to obtain
monopolistic rents (Jayachandran et al., 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013). However, by
emphasizing how multimarket contact can generate mutual forbearance that can support
the governance of alliances through incentive alignment, my arguments and findings
suggest that multimarket contact can also enhance transactional efficiency, broadening
the domains to which mutual forbearance through multimarket competition can apply.

3.2

3.2.1

Theory and Hypotheses

Multimarket Contact and Alliance Governance

In the study of inter-organizational collaboration, misaligned incentives and the
consequential opportunism have been a central theme in multiple theoretical traditions
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such as organizational economics (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989), the social-structural
perspective (Gulati, 1995b; Robinson & Stuart, 2007), and the social-psychological trustbased perspective (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998)
(Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012). However, despite the probable impact of
competitive relationships between alliance partners on their incentive alignment, previous
research has not paid systematic attention to this issue.
Though scant, some existing research that Chen (2008) named as the
“competition-oriented cooperation” literature has examined the tension between
competition and cooperation and how competition between alliance partners affect their
decisions upon alliances and collaboration outcomes. For example, Oxley and Sampson
(2004) posited that in R&D alliances market overlap between partner firms reduces the
likelihood of a broad alliance scope including manufacturing and marketing in addition to
R&D activities. Park and Russo (1996) also showed that joint ventures between direct
competitors are more likely to fail than those in which partners do not compete. These
previous studies were based on the argument that competition in end-product markets, or
market overlap between alliance partners, incentivizes alliance partners to
opportunistically behave by increasing the pay-off from such behaviors. Competition
outside an alliance effectively makes the collaboration a zero-sum game (Oxley &
Sampson, 2004). Also, existing research has considered whether or not alliance partners
are present in the same end-product markets to conceptualize direct competition between
them. Although this formulation captures the competitive tension that exists between
alliance partners, it does not distinguish the nature and breadth of partners’ competitive
relationships, which carry different consequences for partners’ incentives and alliance
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governance. As I will argue below, appreciation of the number of market contacts sheds
new light on the cost of opportunism in alliances and the implications this has for alliance
governance.
When firms decide whether or not to undertake an action such as opportunistic
behavior in alliances, they evaluate the benefits and costs of the action. Since rivals react
to the actions taken by each other, expected costs of an opportunistic behavior should
include the damage that the rivals’ response would entail. The multimarket competition
literature is a research stream that has focused on investigating the competitive actions
and responses between multimarket rivals (see Jayachandran et al. (1999) and Yu &
Cannella Jr. (2013) for reviews). To my knowledge, this literature has not examined the
effect of multimarket contact on alliance governance. However, as I will demonstrate,
this literature would predict that multimarket contact between alliance partners
discourages opportunistic behavior by increasing its cost and thereby makes hierarchical
governance modes less likely to be needed for an alliance. This is opposite to the existing
view in the alliance literature that market overlap increases the likelihood of hierarchical
governance mode due to aggravated contractual hazards, regardless of the number of
market contacts (Oxley & Sampson, 2004).
The core concept of the multimarket competition literature is the so-called mutual
forbearance hypothesis—as two firms share more markets, they tend to mutually forbear
from attacks, therefore lowering the intensity of rivalry (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990;
Edwards, 1955). The reason why mutual forbearance takes place is that multimarket
rivals appreciate that an attack taken in one market may provoke broad retaliation by the
attacked firms, so competitive responses would occur not only in the market where the
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attack was initiated but also in other shared markets. As a consequence, the attacking firm
may incur a larger loss than the gain from the initial attack (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985).
Many previous empirical studies have shown that mutual forbearance between
multimarket rivals attenuates rivalry, as indicated by higher prices (Gimeno & Woo,
1996; Hannan & Prager, 2004), higher profitability (Hannan & Prager, 2009; Parker &
Röller, 1997), lower entry and exit rates (Baum & Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez,
2006), greater stability of market shares (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Sandler, 1988),
less frequent competitive behavior (Young et al., 2000; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2007), lower
service quality (Prince & Simon, 2009), and smaller investments in tangible and
intangible resources (Kang et al., 2010; Shankar, 1999).
The multimarket competition literature also argues that as two firms share more
markets (i.e., have a higher level of multimarket contact), mutual forbearance between
them becomes stronger. This is because multimarket contact enhances two conditions that
are required for mutual forbearance: (1) deterrence from attacks (Bernheim & Whinston,
1990; Edwards, 1955) and (2) mutual understanding of rivals’ capabilities and strategies
and consequently an appreciation of their interdependence (Baum & Korn, 1996).
Deterrence between two firms is proportional to the degree of multimarket contact
between them because more shared markets provide a greater ability, as well as more
opportunities, to retaliate against current attacks (Jayachandran et al., 1999). Multimarket
contact also promotes mutual forbearance by helping multimarket rivals to recognize that
their market prospects are highly interdependent, and that they can be better off by
mutually forbearing from rather than initiating attacks. For two firms to appreciate this
interdependence and implicitly agree on mutual forbearance, both firms should have a
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high level of awareness of each other’s capabilities, tactics and strategies, and reputation
for retaliation. This high level of mutual awareness is more likely to be achieved as two
firms encounter each other in more markets (Jayachandran et al., 1999).
Opportunistic behaviors are also a kind of competitive action that alliance
partners can take within an alliance itself. Just as mutual forbearance deters rivals from
taking aggressive actions such as price cuts and market entry, it can also curb
opportunism in alliances. That is, the possibility of broad retaliation increases the
expected cost of the opportunistic behaviors and thereby reduces the incentives for
alliance partners to behave opportunistically. Accordingly, as two R&D alliance partners
share more markets, they tend to have stronger deterrence and better understanding of
their interdependence and, as a result, are more likely to mutually forbear from behaving
opportunistically; therefore, two R&D alliance partners with a higher level of
multimarket contact have a lower concern about opportunism by partners.
The alliance governance literature has long argued that hierarchical governance
structures involving equity arrangements effectively mitigate the risk of partners’
opportunism by enhancing monitoring, control, and incentive alignment (Kogut, 1988;
Pisano, 1989). Despite these benefits, however, the high costs associated with
establishing and maintaining hierarchical governance structures justify alliance partners’
employing those remedies only when the expected level of opportunism by partners is
substantial. Consistently, since two potential R&D alliance partners who share more
markets are more likely to mutually forbear from opportunism, they have a lesser need to
choose hierarchical governance modes to alleviate the risk of opportunism. By contrast,
when such mutual forbearance from opportunism is not available due to lower levels of
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multimarket contact, they will be more likely to need the benefits of monitoring, control,
and incentive alignment that hierarchical governance structures provide. I therefore posit:
Hypothesis 1. As two partner firms to an R&D collaboration have a higher level
of multimarket contact, the likelihood of the partners employing a
more hierarchical governance structure decreases.

3.2.2

Other Competitive and Cooperative Relationships between Partners

I have argued that multimarket contact between alliance partners effectively
substitutes for hierarchical governance structures by generating mutual forbearance from
opportunism in R&D collaborations. Although I have focused on competitive
relationships between alliance partners in end-product markets, they may also have
different dyadic relationships between them. That is, they may compete against each
other in factor markets as well, just as they might also be embedded in pre-existing
cooperative relationships. Given that the relational context in which alliance partners are
embedded might affect their incentive alignment, the interplay between different types of
dyadic relationships is worth investigating to have a more complete and comprehensive
understanding of the effects of dyadic relationships alliance partners have outside an
alliance on their governance choice. As I argue below, these other competitive and
cooperative relationships between partners represent important boundary conditions for
the effects of multimarket contact on alliance governance captured by my first
hypothesis.
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More specifically, if factor market competition makes multimarket contact more
or less likely to generate mutual forbearance or if cooperative relationships affect the
expected level of opportunism between alliance partners, these interfirm relationships
will also shape the efficacy of multimarket contact as a remedy for opportunism and
hence partners’ reliance on hierarchical governance structures. Therefore, drawing on
recent work in the multimarket competition literature that examines how factor market
rivalry affects mutual forbearance (Markman et al., 2009), I examine how firms’ pursuit
of similar or different technological resources reinforces or dampens the effect of
multimarket contact on alliance governance choice in R&D collaborations. In addition,
drawing on previous research on relational embeddedness (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati, 1995b),
I investigate how the substituting effect of multimarket contact for hierarchical
governance structures becomes stronger or weaker for partners having previous
collaborations with each other.
Moderating effect of technology overlap. While the multimarket competition
literature has predominantly emphasized competition in end-product markets, firms also
compete in factor markets (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and overlap in factor markets may
likewise affect mutual forbearance by reinforcing deterrence from attacks and mutual
understanding of firms’ interdependence (Markman et al., 2009). Since firms may rely on
different factors to produce the same or substituting products, even rivals in the same
end-product markets have different levels of overlap in factor markets between each
other. Given the same number of end-product market contacts, overlap in factor markets
provides extra contacts between firms. Since these extra contacts can promote deterrence
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and understanding of interdependence between multimarket rivals, overlap in factor
markets reinforces mutual forbearance between them.
Deterrence from attacks becomes stronger as two firms have greater overlap in
factor markets in addition to end-product markets because the contacts in factor markets
also provide better ability and more opportunities to retaliate against current attacks.
Simultaneous retaliation in both end-product and factor markets can damage the attacker
more seriously. Also, even when retaliation in end-product markets is prohibitively
costly, firms sharing factor markets still can retaliate in different factor markets
(Markman et al., 2009). For instance, they can seize the top talent or important
specialized input suppliers of the attacking firms. In addition, encounters in factor
markets enhance partners’ understanding of each other’s capabilities and strategies that
support their positions in end product markets (Porter, 1980: 47–71). It also makes them
conceive of each other as more significant competitors and therefore pay more attention
to each other (Porac & Thomas, 1990; Reger & Huff, 1993). For these reasons, overlap in
factor markets helps multimarket rivals in end-product markets better understand their
interdependence.
In high-technology industries, the most important strategic factor to determine
competitive advantages is technology (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). Therefore, technology
overlap between two firms is the most critical aspect of factor market rivalry between
them (DeCarolis, 2003). Since the trajectories of technology development in firms tend to
be path-dependent (Coombs & Hull, 1998), two firms who are highly overlapped in
technology space are likely to compete for the same pools of labor and input suppliers
over a long period of time. Hence, technology overlap between multimarket rivals in end-
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product markets facilitates the formation of mutual forbearance from opportunism.
Therefore, given a certain level of multimarket contact, technology overlap facilitates the
formation of mutual forbearance from opportunism and thus further reduces the need for
hierarchical governance structures to support R&D collaborations. I therefore posit:
Hypothesis 2. The negative effects of multimarket contact on the usage of
hierarchical governance in R&D alliances will be more pronounced when the
partners have technological overlap.

Moderating effect of prior ties. Although I have argued that multimarket contact
between R&D alliance partners reduces the risk of opportunism by partners, they are also
embedded in social networks of cooperative relationships that shape expectations of
opportunism. When trust is defined as “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that
one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically (Bradach & Eccles, 1989: 104),”
organizational researchers have argued and empirically shown that interfirm trust
increases with repeated interactions (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Gulati & Sytch, 2008;
Parkhe, 1993). Therefore, the number of previous experience of interactions (i.e., prior
ties) with a potential partner is expected to reduce potential hazards of opportunism and,
in turn, may affect the effect of multimarket contact on alliance governance choice.
Gulati (1995a) has shown that past alliances between firms enhance the likelihood of a
future exchange in the form of a new partnership between them, and he has also
demonstrated that the reduced risk of opportunism leads them to opt for a non-equity
structure rather than an equity alliance that would bring greater joint controls and
enhanced incentive alignment through shared equity (Gulati, 1995b).
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I argue that since multimarket contact and prior ties fulfill a redundant role of
reducing the risk of opportunism by partners, they substitute for each other in affecting
alliance partners’ decisions regarding remedies for such a risk. When two potential
alliance partners have prior ties and thus expect a lower level of opportunism by partners,
the relative contribution that multimarket contact makes to mitigating cooperation
hazards will tend to be lower. However, when prior ties between firms are lacking and
the risk of opportunism is greater, it can be especially beneficial to have the shadow of
the future and mutual forbearance from opportunism emerging from multimarket contact
to support R&D collaborations. Therefore, the substituting effect of multimarket contact
for hierarchical governance structures is expected to be most pronounced for first-time
collaborators exposed to a greater risk of opportunism and will diminish for firms with a
more extensive cooperative history. I therefore posit:
Hypothesis 3. The negative effects of multimarket contact on the usage of
hierarchical governance in R&D alliances will diminish with prior
ties.

3.3

3.3.1

Methods

Data and Sample

To empirically investigate how multimarket contact between alliance partners
affects their governance choices for R&D alliances in high-technology industries, I used
the global biopharmaceutical industry as my research setting, for several reasons. First,
the biopharmaceutical industry is a high-technology industry where R&D intensity is
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substantial. Second, market definition in this industry is very clear. Like other empirical
work in the multimarket competition literature, in my study markets should be defined to
ensure that two firms defined to be present in the same market actually compete against
each other. Markets in this industry are defined by therapeutic classes that are widelyaccepted and commonly-used by U.S. government authorities and industry players (e.g.,
cholesterol regulators, antiulcerants, and antipsychotics) (Anand et al., 2009). Since
different products in the same therapeutic class are generally substitutes for each other,
firms offering their products in the same therapeutic class compete with each other.
Third, alliances are frequently observed in the industry (Hagedoorn, 2002), and many
studies of alliance governance have been carried out in biopharmaceuticals (Gulati &
Singh, 1998; Phene & Tallman, 2012; Pisano, 1989; Robinson & Stuart, 2007), which
facilitates comparisons between my study and extant research.
In order to examine firms’ presence in different end-product markets, I used data
provided by IMS Health that contains prescription drug sales by therapeutic class for
biopharmaceutical companies around the world; in the data, there were 338 distinct
therapeutic classes and each therapeutic class was defined as a distinct market. For the
alliance data, I relied on Thomson Reuters’ Recap database. As Schilling (2009) has
shown, the Recap database is the most robust and representative in its coverage of
alliances in the global biopharmaceutical industry and thus has been widely used in
previous work on R&D collaborations in this industry (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011;
Lerner et al., 2003; Robinson & Stuart, 2007). To develop patent-related variables, I drew
on patent data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
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To construct my base sample, I first extracted all the R&D partnerships reported
in the Recap database between 2007 and 2013. Using the definition of R&D partnerships
by Hagedoorn (2002), I included contractual partnerships, such as joint R&D pacts and
joint development agreements, and equity-based partnerships such as minority equity
R&D partnerships and R&D joint ventures. Pure patent licensing agreements were
excluded. Since my theory on the effects of multimarket contact on alliance governance
is fundamentally dyadic, I excluded 167 alliances that were formed between more than
two firms, leaving 3,523 observations in my sample. Out of the 3,523 R&D partnerships,
201 (5.7%) were equity-based alliances, including minority equity partnerships and joint
ventures while the remaining 3,322 (94.3%) were non-equity alliances. Then, for the
firms involved in those R&D collaboration agreements, I examined their activities in endproduct markets from the IMS Health data to measure their competitive relationships, as
described below.

3.3.2

Measures

Dependent variable. The dependent variable, Equity Allianceij, takes the value of
one if two R&D alliance partners, firm i and firm j, choose an equity-based governance
structure (either minority investment or joint venture), and zero for non-equity deals.7
The dependent variable therefore captures the degree of hierarchy in alliances. Equity
involvement is the most critical control mechanism to enhance incentive alignment,

7

To check if there are R&D alliances where the governance modes change (e.g., from non-equity to equity
or from equity to non-equity) in my sample, I collected all the repeated alliances between the sample
partners and checked the detailed specifics of the alliances. To my best knowledge, however, there was no
such case.
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monitoring, and enforcement (Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1989). Therefore, bifurcation of the
hybrid governance structures on the markets-hierarchies governance continuum into nonequity and equity alliances has been the most commonly used approach in the alliance
governance literature (Gulati, 1995b; Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996; Li et al., 2008; Li,
Eden, Hitt, Ireland, & Garrett, 2012; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Phene & Tallman, 2012;
Pisano, 1989; Robinson & Stuart, 2007). I also use this categorization for clarity,
simplicity, and comparability with previous work. In supplemental analyses presented
below, I also follow previous research on alliance governance in biopharmaceuticals in
separating minority equity partnerships and joint ventures (Gulati & Singh, 1998).
Explanatory variables. The key independent variable of this study used for
hypothesis testing is Multimarket Contactij, which measures the degree of multimarket
contact between firm i and firm j in the year of R&D partnership. Following the literature
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), I operationalize the variable as
follows:
∑
∑

∑

In this expression, m represents the set of markets. For market definition, I treat each
therapeutic class (e.g., cholesterol regulator, antiulcerants, and antipsychotics) as a
distinct end-product market. Iim (Ijm) is an indicator taking the value of one if firm i (firm
j) is present in market m in the year of R&D partnership, and zero otherwise. The
multimarket contact measure represents the number of market contact between the two
firms over the sum of the each firm’s number of markets. Many different measures for
multimarket contact have been developed and used in the multimarket competition
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literature. Basically, the measures are constructed from counts of market contacts, but
different weights are often employed. Since reliability as well as discriminant and
predictive validity have been found to differ across the measures and no consensus exists
as to which one is best (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001), I choose this simple measure to be
parsimonious (Gimeno & Woo, 1996).8
To test the moderating effects of partners’ overlap in factor markets (i.e., H2), I
construct a measure of technology overlap, or the extent to which two alliance partners
draw upon similar technological resources in factor markets. For this variable, I employ
the angular measure initially developed by Jaffe (1986) that has been widely accepted
and extensively used in the literature for this purpose (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, &
Jaffe, 2006; Li et al., 2008):
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Given that my sampled firms have patented in 462 distinct three-digit USPTO patent
classes,

(

) is the number of patents that Firm i (Firm j) have applied in patent class s

for the last ten years before the year of their R&D partnership (Benner & Waldfogel,
2008); these patent applications are all approved in the end. Therefore,

represents

Firm i (Firm j)’s distribution of patents across various patent classes. Technology Overlap
ranges from zero to one, where values closer to one indicate greater overlap between two

8
For robustness check, I also used Baum and Korn's, (1999) measure weighting each market contact with
its importance. However, the results did not change significantly (results available upon request).
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firms in technology space. As a robustness check, I also used a five-year time window to
count the number of patent applications, but obtained the qualitatively same results as
those presented below.
To examine the potential role that partners’ cooperative history plays as a
boundary condition for the effects of multimarket contract on R&D alliance governance
(i.e., H3), I constructed a measure of Prior Ties by counting the number of previous
agreements two firms in a dyad entered into in the past ten years before the focal deal.
Including this variable in the models is also helpful for controlling the direct effects of
previous cooperative experience on governance choice. As above, I also examined this
variable for a five-year time-frame and found the results to be robust.
Control variables. In addition to the above covariates, I incorporate variables in
the models that might be related to firms’ alliance governance choices or their
competitive relationships. First, at transaction level I control for the degree of exploration
and the scope of the collaboration. As activities in a given R&D project are more
explorative, appropriation concerns become stronger because adequate specification of
property rights can be problematic (Freeman, 1997; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1991). In my
context, the degree of exploration is well approximated by phases in new drug
development. The new drug development process is typically categorized into discovery,
lead molecule, formulation, preclinical, clinical phases I/II/III, and FDA approval phases
from the beginning to the end, where earlier phases entail greater exploration (Robinson
& Stuart, 2007). Therefore, I categorize the first four phases as early stage (i.e., high
degree of exploration) through an indicator variable. As a robustness check, I also
examined phase fixed effects and obtained qualitatively similar results as those presented
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below. Also, since alliance scope has been shown to affect the level of appropriation risk
(Oxley & Sampson, 2004), I include a dummy variable taking the value of one if a given
R&D alliance also contains either manufacturing or marketing activities, and zero
otherwise.
Although I focus on relational embeddedness (i.e., Prior Ties) for my theory
development, the social-structural perspective in the alliance literature has found that
structural embeddedness also affects alliance formation and governance choices (Gulati
& Gargiulo, 1999). Since they are related concepts, controlling for structural
embeddedness can help to show the effect of relational embeddedness on governance
choice independent of structural embeddedness. To control for structural embeddedness, I
used measures for indirect ties and degree centrality. To measure indirect ties, I count the
number of indirect ties at degree distance two using the complete network in the
biopharmaceutical field reported in the Recap database (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr,
1996). Degree centrality is measured by the total number of ties the firm had entered
within the entire industry network. Prior ties between alliance partners in a dyad were
excluded from measuring degree centrality to ensure that the latter is independent from
the former. Specifically, I construct two dyad-level measures, Degree Centrality (Max)
and Ratio of Degree Centrality. While the former refers to the level of degree centrality
of the firm who has the larger value in a dyad, the latter means the ratio of degree
centrality of the smaller firm to that of the larger firm in the dyad.
I also control for some other firm-level factors that may influence their alliance
governance choices. When a partner firm is large, equity sharing can be prohibitively
expensive, particularly when both partners are large. Also, prior research argued that
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asymmetrical sizes between alliance partners may affect their governance choices by
causing more conflicts (Li et al., 2012). To control for these effects, I include in the
model the sales of the larger firm in a given dyad (i.e., Sales (Max)) and the ratio of sales
of the smaller firm to those of the larger firm in a given dyad (i.e., Ratio of Sales)
(Gimeno, 2004).
The knowledge bases of alliance partners may also affect their decisions
regarding governance structures. Firms with significant knowledge bases may prefer
more hierarchical governance structures because they tend to have greater concerns about
coordination and misappropriation (Phene & Tallman, 2012). To control for these effects,
I construct Patent Counts (Max) and Ratio of Patent Counts. While the former counts the
number of patents by the firm with the most patents in the dyad, the latter represents the
ratio of patent counts (i.e., the number of patents by the firm with less patents divided by
the number of patents by the partner). In addition, each partner’s knowledge in the
technological areas of the given alliance can influence governance structures more than
its overall knowledge base does. Thus, I developed Focal Knowledge (Max) and Ratio of
Focal Knowledge. To operationalize these variables, I mapped the technological areas
reported for each alliance in the Recap database with the three-digit USPTO patent
classes and then based on the mapping I counted the patents applied for the past ten years
prior to the given alliance in the relevant patent classes. Using these patent counts in the
technological areas of the given alliance, I measure the two variables in the same way as I
do for overall patent counts.
I also include three different classes of fixed effects in the models. Because the
types of technologies and diseases involved in a focal alliance may influence the
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governance structure of the alliance, technological domain fixed effects and disease fixed
effects are included in the model. Finally, to capture any broader, economy-wide factors
influencing the propensity for firms to include equity arrangements, year fixed effects are
also included.

3.3.3

Statistical Methods

Because the dependent variable of this study, Equity Allianceij, is a binary
variable, I use a probit regression model with robust errors as my base model. For
robustness analyses, I use three additional statistical methods: ordered probit models,
probit models with sample selection, and probit models with continuous endogenous
regressors. First, although bifurcation of hybrid governance structures into equity and
non-equity alliances is widely accepted in the literature (Gulati, 1995b; Li et al., 2008;
Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Phene & Tallman, 2012; Pisano, 1989), this categorization of
collaborations does not fully capture differential degrees of hierarchical control across
different hybrid governance structures. I therefore estimated ordered probit models using
three governance categories for the dependent variable, following Gulati and Singh
(1998). Specifically, I categorize alliances into non-equity alliances, minority equity
partnerships, and joint ventures. Gulati and Singh (1998) argued that joint ventures are
more hierarchical than minority investments because the former are superior in
monitoring and enforcement. The separate administrative hierarchy of managers in a joint
venture not only makes detailed information on daily operations more accessible but also
reinforces control by fiat (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Therefore, non-equity alliances,
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minority equity partnerships, and joint ventures can be ordered in their degree of
hierarchy from lowest to highest for the hybrid portion of the markets-hierarchies
governance continuum.
Second, since my sample consists of realized alliance deals only, selection bias
may be a concern. To mitigate this concern, I use bivariate probit models with sample
selection, which are the equivalent of Heckman's (1979) selection model except that the
outcome equation (i.e., second-stage equation) is also a probit model. To run the firststage selection model, I add 10 random unrealized alliance dyads for each of the realized
alliances in my sample. As an instrument in the first-stage model, I use the average
number of the two partner firms’ previous licensing agreements with universities,
following Robinson and Stuart (2007). Since partner firms licensing patents granted to
universities may be regarded as an attractive partner, it may affect the likelihood of
alliance formation, but it is unlikely to be related to their alliance governance structures.
Third, I also use probit models with continuous endogenous regressors to address
a possible alternative explanation that multimarket rivals might refrain from opportunism
due to the high value of the collaborations between them, rather than possible retaliation.
Some might argue that R&D collaborations between multimarket rivals could be
extremely damaging if key knowledge is leaked to the partners and thus multimarket
rivals partner with each other only when the upside of the partnership is substantial. This
logic might also predict the low use of hierarchical governance structures in the R&D
alliances between multimarket rivals because the participating firms would abstain from
opportunistic behaviors not to ruin the high potential partnerships. That is, this logic
suggests that the mechanism through which multimarket contact reduces the likelihood of
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hierarchical governance modes being chosen is not the possible costs caused by
retaliation against opportunism, but the possible costs of losing the high value
collaboration due to opportunism. If this alternative explanation is true, my probit models
have an endogeneity problem (more specifically, omitted variable bias) because my main
theoretical variable (i.e., Multimarket Contact) will be (positively) correlated with the
unobservable value of the given R&D alliance. To address this endogeneity problem, I
run probit models with continuous endogenous variables using the logarithm of the sum
of each partner’s number of markets as an instrument (Wooldridge, 2002). The
requirement for the instrument variable is that it should be correlated with the degree of
multimarket contact, but not with governance choice. When a firm is present in many
markets, this firm is more likely to be overlapped with other firms for a simply
probabilistic reason. Therefore, when two potential partners compete in many markets,
they are likely to have a high level of market overlap. However, the number of markets
where two partner firms are present is unlikely to affect their governance choice,
especially when their sizes are controlled.

3.4

Results

Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables
used in the analyses. The correlation between Multimarket Contact and Equity Alliance is
negative and significant as predicted. Although there are many pairs of variables that
show significant pairwise correlations, my models do not suffer from multicollinearity
issues. The variance inflation factor for Degree Centrality (Max) is the highest (5.00), but

74
is still below the recommended cutoff level of 10 (Neter et al., 1996). Table 3.2 shows the
results from probit regression models examining how the degree of multimarket contact
between two alliance partners affects their alliance governance choice (Hypothesis 1) and
how this relationship is moderated by technology overlap and prior ties (Hypothesis 2
and 3 respectively). Model 1 contains control variables only, and Model 2 adds the direct
effect of multimarket contact. The coefficient of Multimarket Contact in Model 2 is
negative and significant (b=-10.98 and p<0.05), supporting Hypothesis 1. That is, as
alliance partners have a higher level of multimarket contact, they are less likely to choose
equity structure in their R&D collaborations. To estimate the economic significance of
this variable, I examined how changes in Multimarket Contact affect the likelihood of
equity alliance being chosen. Using the values of Multimarket Contact at its mean and
mean plus one standard deviation, I calculated the response for each observation and then
averaged those responses (Hoetker, 2007; Train, 1986). I observed that an increase in
Multimarket Contact by one standard deviation from the mean reduces the predicted
probability for equity arrangements by 55.2 percent.
Models 3-7 test the moderating effects of technology overlap and prior ties. Since
the coefficient of the interaction term between Multimarket Contact and Technology
Overlap in Model 4 is negative and significant (b=-565.4 and p<0.01), Hypothesis 2 is
supported. That is, the negative effect of multimarket contact on the likelihood of equity
structure being chosen is intensified when two alliance partners are also overlapped in
technology space. Models 5 and 6 test Hypothesis 3 predicting that the effect of
multimarket contact on governance choice is dampened as two alliance partners have
more previous collaborations together. The coefficient of the interaction term between
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Multimarket Contact and Prior Ties in Model 6 is estimated to be positive and significant
in Model 6 (b=8.413 and p<0.01) as predicted in Hypothesis 3. In addition, the results
from Model 7 where both moderating effects of technology overlap and prior ties are
estimated together are consistent with the individual results in Model 4 and 6. Although
the hypothesized moderating effects are supported by the interpretation of the relevant
coefficients, the effect—and even the sign—of an interaction also depends upon the
coefficients of the composite variables and the values of all other variables in probit
models (Hoetker, 2007). Therefore, I provide graphical presentations of the interaction
effects, following Hoetker (2007). For this exercise, while I used certain values of interest
for the explanatory variables (i.e., Multimarket Contact, Technology Overlap, and Prior
Ties), I used observed values for all other right-hand side variables to calculate the
average response (Hoetker, 2007; Train, 1986). The graph in Panel A (Panel B) in Figure
3.1 shows how the relationship between Multimarket Contact and predicted probability
for equity alliance changes depending on the values of Technology Overlap (Prior Ties).
Specifically, when the value of Technology Overlap increases from its mean to one and
two standard deviation above the mean, the downward slope becomes steeper, presenting
that the negative effect of multimarket contact on the likelihood of equity alliance being
chosen is reinforced as R&D alliance partners have a higher degree of technology
overlap. By contrast, as the value of Prior Ties moves from zero to one and two, the
downward slope becomes flatter in Panel B in Figure 3.1, supporting that the substituting
effect of multimarket contact for hierarchical governance structures is weakened as two
R&D alliance partners have more previous collaboration experience.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables
(1) Equity Alliance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

1

(2) Multimarket Contact

-0.04

1

(3) Technology Overlap

0.02

0.17

1

(4) Prior Ties

-0.01

0.09

0.15

1

(5) Early Stage

0.03

-0.07

0.01

0.04

1

(6) Alliance Scope

0.04

0.11

0.14

0.07

-0.13

1

(7) Indirect Ties

-0.03

0.33

0.17

0.16

-0.04

-0.01

1

(8) Degree Centrality (Max)

0.02

0.14

0.20

0.22

0.09

-0.01

0.27

1

(9) Ratio of Degree Centrality

-0.03

-0.01

-0.03

-0.04

-0.07

0.01

0.00

-0.28

1

(10) Size (Max)

0.03

0.20

0.16

0.14

0.10

-0.01

0.18

0.55

-0.07

1

(11) Ratio of Size

-0.06

-0.09

-0.14

-0.08

-0.09

-0.08

-0.04

-0.19

0.04

-0.37

1

(12) Focal Knowledge (Max)

0.01

0.13

0.2

0.11

0.16

0.01

0.18

0.49

-0.14

0.49

-0.27

1

(13) Ratio of Focal Knowledge

-0.04

-0.06

-0.15

-0.1

-0.25

-0.02

-0.04

-0.34

0.22

-0.28

0.32

-0.33

1

(14) Patent Counts (Max.)

-0.02

0.06

0.09

0.06

-0.01

0.03

0.1

0.36

-0.11

0.32

-0.23

0.37

-0.21

1

(15) Ratio of Patent Counts

-0.04

-0.01

-0.1

-0.08

-0.07

-0.04

0

-0.33

0.27

-0.27

0.32

-0.22

0.54

-0.22

1

Mean

0.06

0.01

0.12

0.10

0.43

0.14

0.81

66.67

0.23

7.39

0.54

116.5

0.49

233.3

0.31

Standard Deviation

0.23

0.04

0.26

0.38

0.50

0.35

5.87

101.2

0.34

14.30

0.49

320.4

0.48

649.0

0.43

Min

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Max

1

0.41

1

5

1

1

147

450

1

61.80

1

4083

1

14533

1

Note: N=3,523. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at least at 0.05 level.
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Table 3.2. Probit Regression Results

Variables
Multimarket Contact
Technology Overlap
Multimarket Contact ×
Technology Overlap
Prior Ties
Multimarket Contact ×
Prior Ties
Early Stage
Alliance Scope
Indirect Ties
Degree Centrality (Max)
Ratio of Degree Centrality
Size (Max)
Ratio of Size
Focal Knowledge (Max)
Ratio of Focal Knowledge
Patent Counts (Max)
Ratio of Patent Counts
Constant

Models
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
H2
H3
H3
H2 & H3
-7.04
-10.68** -17.60** -11.27*
(4.47)
(4.97)
(8.377)
(6.10)
0.08
0.09
(0.14)
(0.14)
-565.4***
-554.6***
(173.4)
(172.15)
-0.08
-0.10
-0.10
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
8.41**
7.94***
(3.69)
(3.04)
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
0.04
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
(0.11)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
-0.10** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.08**
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.09
-0.07
-0.07
-0.07
-0.06
-0.06
-0.06
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.13)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.18*
-0.19*
-0.18*
-0.18*
-0.19*
-0.19*
-0.18*
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
-0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.23**
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
-1.27*** -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.28*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.28***
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.16)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(1)
H1

(2)
(3)
H1
H2
-10.98** -10.98**
(5.15)
(5.11)
0.06
(0.14)

Year Fixed Effects
Technology Fixed Effects
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log likelihood
-682.4
-676.5
-676.4
-674.6
-676.3
-675.9
-673.9
Wald Chi-squared
1672.2*** 1559.4*** 1529.4*** 1708.9*** 1556.9*** 1558.7*** 1710.6***
Observations
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
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Figure 3.1. The Contingent Effects of Multimarket Contact
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3.4.1

Supplemental Analyses

Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the results of robustness checks using ordered
probit models, probit models with sample selection, and probit models with continuous
endogenous regressors respectively. As shown in Table 3.3, the results from ordered
probit models provide support to the hypotheses as before. In addition, the second cut
point is significantly larger than the first one in all models, justifying my categorization
scheme.
Table 3.4 shows the results from bivariate probit models with sample selection. In
the first-stage selection model (Model 1), the coefficient for the average number of
licensing agreements with universities is positive and significant (b=0.05 and p<0.01).
The Wald chi-square tests show that the selection bias is not significant in my sample.
Furthermore, the results from the bivariate probit models with sample selection again
lead to the same interpretations as those presented above.
Lastly, Table 3.5 presents the results from probit models with endogenous
regressors. The Wald test of the exogeneity of the instrumented variable (i.e.,
Multimarket Contact) does not reject the null that the instrumented variable is exogenous
(

(1)=1.27 and p=0.26), which recommends that a standard probit model is appropriate.

Furthermore, the coefficient of Multimarket Contact is still negative and significant (b=15.4 and p<0.01), supporting the negative main effect of multimarket contact on the
likelihood of equity arrangements being included.
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Table 3.3. Ordered Probit Regression Results
Models
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Variables
H2
H3
H3
H2 & H3
Multimarket Contact
-7.01
-10.60** -17.55** -11.22*
(4.41)
(4.91)
(8.27)
(6.05)
Technology Overlap
0.07
0.08
(0.14)
(0.14)
Multimarket Contact ×
-566.8***
-552.0***
Technology Overlap
(166.3)
(165.4)
Prior Ties
-0.08
-0.10
-0.10
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Multimarket Contact ×
8.44** 7.87***
Prior Ties
(3.66)
(3.03)
Early Stage
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Alliance Scope
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Indirect Ties
-0.10** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08**
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
Degree Centrality (Max)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Ratio of Degree Centrality
-0.10
-0.08
-0.08
-0.08
-0.08
-0.07
-0.07
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.12)
Size (Max)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Ratio of Size
-0.17*
-0.18*
-0.18*
-0.18*
-0.18*
-0.18*
-0.18*
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Focal Knowledge (Max)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Ratio of Focal Knowledge
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Patent Counts (Max)
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Ratio of Patent Counts
-0.20*
-0.20*
-0.20*
-0.20*
-0.20*
-0.21*
-0.21*
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
Constant cut1
1.30*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.30***
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
Constant cut2
2.80*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 2.82*** 2.80*** 2.81*** 2.82***
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
Log likelihood
-708.0
-702.1
-702.1
-700.3
-701.9
-701.5
-699.5
Wald Chi-squared
846.9*** 966.0*** 864.6*** 1127.1*** 872.1*** 908.6*** 1211.6***
Observations
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
(1)
H1

(2)
(3)
H1
H2
-10.92** -10.91**
(5.11)
(5.07)
0.05
(0.14)
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Table 3.4. Probit Regression Results with Sample Selection
(1)
Selection
Variables
Multimarket Contact

(2)

(5)

0.05
(0.08)
0.04
(0.10)
-0.09**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.18*
(0.11)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.09)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.22**
(0.11)

0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.09**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.19*
(0.10)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.09)
-0.00***
(0.00)
-0.22**
(0.11)

0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.09**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.18*
(0.11)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.09)
-0.00***
(0.00)
-0.22**
(0.11)

H2
-7.02
(4.47)
0.09
(0.14)
-565.2***
(172.8)
0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.09**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.18*
(0.11)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.09)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.22**
(0.11)

0.03
(0.10)
-1.32***
(0.21)
Yes
Yes

0.00
(0.10)
-1.26***
(0.21)
Yes
Yes

0.01
(0.10)
-1.28***
(0.21)
Yes
Yes

0.01
(0.10)
-1.29***
(0.21)
Yes
Yes

H1

Technology Overlap
Multimarket Contact ×
Technology Overlap
Early Stage
Alliance Scope
Indirect Ties
Degree Centrality (Max)
Ratio of Degree Centrality
Size (Max)
Ratio of Size

7.09***
(0.06)
0.01***
(0.00)
-0.53***
(0.02)
0.00***
(0.00)
-0.13***
(0.04)

Focal Knowledge (Max)
Ratio of Focal Knowledge
Patent Counts (Max)
Ratio of Patent Counts
Avg. Licensing with Univ.

0.00**
(0.00)
0.02
(0.03)
0.05***
(0.01)

Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

-1.32***
(0.04)

Model
(4)
Outcome
H1
H2
-10.98**
-10.95**
(5.17)
(5.12)
0.07
(0.14)
(3)

Year Fixed Effects
Technology Fixed Effects
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-9568.5
-9562.6
-9562.5
-9560.7
Wald Chi-squared
1544.8***
1717.4***
1642.7***
1903.0***
2
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ (1)
0.09
0.00
0.01
0.01
(p-value)
(p=0.77)
(p=0.99)
(p=0.93)
(p=0.92)
Observations
3,523
3,523
3,523
3,523
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. Even when
we included Multimarket Contact in the selection stage, we obtained the qualitatively same results.
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Table 3.4. Continued
(6)
Variables
Multimarket Contact

H3
-10.67**
(4.99)

Model
(7)
Outcome
H3
-17.62**
(8.38)

Technology Overlap
Multimarket Contact × Technology Overlap
Prior Ties

-0.08
(0.10)

Multimarket Contact × Prior Ties
Early Stage
Alliance Scope
Indirect Ties
Degree Centrality (Max)
Ratio of Degree Centrality
Size (Max)
Ratio of Size
Focal Knowledge (Max)
Ratio of Focal Knowledge
Patent Counts (Max)
Ratio of Patent Counts
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.08**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.19*
(0.10)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.09)
-0.00***
(0.00)
-0.22**
(0.11)
0.00
(0.10)
-1.26***
(0.21)

-0.10
(0.10)
8.42**
(3.72)
0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.09**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.19*
(0.11)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.09)
-0.00***
(0.00)
-0.22**
(0.11)
-0.00
(0.10)
-1.26***
(0.21)
Yes
Yes

(8)
H2/H3
-11.23*
(6.07)
0.09
(0.14)
-554.5***
(171.6)
-0.10
(0.10)
7.93***
(3.04)
0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.08**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.18*
(0.11)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.09)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.23**
(0.11)
0.01
(0.10)
-1.29***
(0.21)
Yes
Yes

Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-9562.4
-9562.0
-9560.0
Wald Chi-squared
1823.7***
1723.1***
14208***
2
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ (1) (p-value)
0.00 (p=0.99) 0.00 (p=0.98) 0.01 (p=0.92)
Observations
3,523
3,523
3,523
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. Even when
we included Multimarket Contact in the selection stage, we obtained the qualitatively same results.
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Table 3.5. Probit Regression Results with Continuous Endogenous Regressors
Model
(1)
Variables
Multimarket Contact
Early Stage
Alliance Scope
Indirect Ties
Degree Centrality (Max)
Ratio of Degree Centrality
Size (Max)
Ratio of Size
Focal Knowledge (Max)
Ratio of Focal Knowledge
Patent Counts (Max)
Ratio of Patent Counts

Equity Alliance
-15.374**
(5.983)
0.022
(0.082)
0.116
(0.105)
-0.076*
(0.043)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.026
(0.131)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.169*
(0.101)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.088)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.209*
(0.108)

Log (Sum of Num. of Markets)
Constant
Year Fixed Effects
Technology Fixed Effects
Disease Fixed Effects
Log Pseudolikelihood
Wald Chi-squared
Rho

-1.256***
(0.154)
Yes
Yes
Yes

(2)
Multimarket
Contact
-0.004***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.003)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.036***
(0.007)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.003**
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
Yes

6585.6
1598.8***
0.170
(0.148)
Simga
0.031***
(0.003)
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1)
1.27
(p-value)
(0.260)
Observations
3,523
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
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In addition, the alternative explanation that multimarket rivals might abstain from
opportunism not to lose their high value collaboration is based on the assumption that
multimarket rivals normally avoid partnering with each other due to high risks and
collaborate only when their collaboration is expected to be extremely valuable.
Accordingly, this assumption is likely to predict that the average effect of multimarket
contact on the likelihood of alliance formation would be negative. However, though not
reported in Table 3.4, when I include Multimarket Contact in the first-stage selection
equation, the coefficient of Multimarket Contact is positive and significant (b=1.50 and
p<0.05); that is, multimarket contact promotes alliance formation. Therefore, at least in
my sample I could conclude that the mechanism through which multimarket contact
influences opportunism and governance choice is the possible costs caused by retaliation
against opportunism rather than the possible costs of losing a high value collaboration
due to opportunism.

3.5

3.5.1

Discussion

Contributions and Implications

In broad terms, my paper’s theoretical contribution lies in bringing together the
bodies of literature on multimarket contract as well as alliance governance, and I also
make theoretical contributions to each of these literatures. First, my theory and findings
contribute to the competition-cooperation research, in particular the “competition-
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oriented cooperation” literature (Chen, 2008)9 by highlighting the importance of
considering partners’ potential competitive reactions and the number of market contacts
between partners in predicting the effects of competition on cooperation. The
competition-oriented cooperation literature has examined how various competitive
attributes affect outcomes of collaborations (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995;
Dussauge et al., 2000; Harrigan, 1988; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). The main view
in this literature has been that competitive relationships in end-product markets
incentivize alliance partners to behave opportunistically by increasing the private benefits
from such behaviors in alliances (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). In addition, the previous
work has tended to rely on alliance partners’ co-presence in the same broadly-defined
industry (e.g., at the 4-digit SIC level) to conceptualize their competitive tension in
theory development.
By contrast, however, my theory based on the multimarket competition literature
argues that as alliance partners encounter each other in more end-product markets, they
can retaliate against each other’s opportunistic behaviors across multiple markets more
effectively and thus they tend to mutually forbear from such behaviors. That is, my
theory emphasizes the need to take into account partners’ potential competitive reactions
and the costs caused by them, which is made possible by accommodating the partners’
contacts in different end-product markets. As a consequence, I provide evidence that in
some cases partner competition can actually support collaboration rather than undermine
it. I conclude that competition can therefore have complex effects on alliances and the

9
Chen (2008) categorized competition-cooperation studies into “co-opetition,” “competition-oriented
cooperation,” and “cooperation-oriented competition” studies.
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governance of collaborative agreements, so I would call for more research on the
competitive context of alliances in future studies of interfirm cooperation.
Second, my arguments and findings contribute to the alliance literature that
emphasizes economic—either cooperative or competitive—relationships in which firms
are embedded as determinants of opportunism and governance choice. While the
literature has paid substantial attention to previous cooperative relationships, it has paid
very little attention to competitive relationships and thus I had little understanding on
possible interactions between different types of dyadic relationships located outside an
alliance. My results show that when various transactional attributes related to R&D
alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry (e.g., development phases, scope,
technologies, and diseases) are controlled, mutual forbearance generated by multimarket
contact (i.e., competition between partners outside an alliance) can substitute for
hierarchical governance structures as remedies for opportunism; furthermore, this
substituting relationship is intensified and dampened by rivalry in factor markets (i.e.,
technology space in my case) and prior collaborative experience respectively. The
broader competitive and cooperative context of a given alliance therefore determines the
implications of multimarket contact on alliance governance. It would be valuable in
future research to give more attention to the competitive context of collaboration and its
interplay with cooperative relationships between firms. This point also motivates more
research integrating the cooperative strategy literature and the competitive strategy
literature, which have tended to develop separately in recent years.
Finally, my theory and evidence contribute to the multimarket competition
literature by developing novel implications of multimarket contact and the mutual
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forbearance it creates. Previous work in the multimarket competition has entirely
regarded mutual forbearance as tacit collusion that takes place across markets
(Jayachandran et al., 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013), in other words, firms’
“subordination in their rivals’ territories in exchange for the rivals’ subordination in the
firms’ important markets (Gimeno, 1999).” Accordingly, from the conventional
viewpoint, the motivation behind mutual forbearance is monopolistic rent seeking. The
empirical research in this literature is constituent with this focus by emphasizing
collusive outcomes of multimarket contact such as higher prices (Gimeno & Woo, 1996;
Hannan & Prager, 2004), higher profitability (Hannan & Prager, 2009; Parker & Röller,
1997), and greater stability of market shares (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Sandler,
1988). In contrast, I argue and show that multimarket contact can also enhance
transaction efficiency by curbing opportunism through mutual forbearance; this benefit
from multimarket contact and mutual forbearance has nothing to do with monopolistic
rent because it takes place within the R&D alliance, not in end-product markets where
combined market power can earn monopolistic rent. Therefore, I extend the domain of
multimarket competition research from collusion-based monopolistic rent seeking to
efficiency-based exchanges in the context of collaborative agreements. Broadly speaking,
while the multimarket competition literature has exclusively examined the effects of
multimarket contact on firms’ competitive strategy, I suggest that linking the implications
and findings from the literature with cooperative strategy is an important but
understudied research topic.
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3.5.2

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Extensions might address several limitations of this study and pursue several
other research opportunities besides the ones I have already mentioned. To begin with, it
would be interesting to examine particular aspects of alliance governance to investigate
the implications of multimarket contact through finer-grained analyses of collaborations.
For instance, extensions might consider particular dimensions of hierarchical controls
such as command structures, authority systems, incentive systems, standard operating
procedures, dispute resolution procedures, and non-market pricing systems (e.g., Gulati
& Singh, 1998). Since equity arrangements tend to make an interfirm exchange more
hierarchical on all these dimensions at once, they are regarded to be the main determinant
of hierarchy in alliances. However, firms can incorporate certain benefits of hierarchical
control into contract designs (Argyres & Mayer, 2007), and the level of hierarchical
control varies within each of the discrete governance structures (e.g., non-equity
alliances, minority equity partnerships, and joint ventures) (Reuer & Ariño, 2007). In
addition, given that opportunism can appear in various forms and at different levels, it
would be interesting to examine specific types of opportunism and whether mutual
forbearance through multimarket contact is uniformly important. As one example,
multimarket contact might be able to effectively deter opportunism in non-core R&D
activities, but when it comes to a disruptive technology, the deterrence from opportunism
that multimarket contact provides might be insufficient to safeguard against opportunism
(Anand et al., 2009; Jayachandran et al., 1999). In such a case, multimarket rivals may
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write simple contract provisions on peripheral areas due to reduced risk of opportunism
but incorporate stringent provisions pertaining to property rights.
Future studies might also examine the performance implications of multimarket
contact. Deterrence from opportunism generated by multimarket contact not only may
save costs associated with governing and managing R&D collaborations but also may
enhance the outcomes of cooperative agreements. For example, because reduced
opportunism between multimarket rivals decreases the likelihood of conflicts, R&D
alliances between them may be more robust than those between alliance partners that do
not share multiple markets (Hennart, Roehl, & Zietlow, 1999; Park & Ungson, 1997). In
addition to shaping alliance survival, multimarket contact and the reduced opportunism it
entails may result in better R&D performance while limiting ex post conflicts such as
patent litigation.
In this paper, I considered the moderating effects of external factors regarding
factor markets and previous collaboration experience. However, the multimarket
competition literature has suggested that internal factors can also influence the generation
of mutual forbearance through affecting internal coordination within firms. For example,
Golden and Ma (2003) argued that mutual forbearance is facilitated when firms have
integrating mechanisms and incentive systems for internal cooperation within them. Yu
and colleagues (2009) also found that local subsidiaries further reduce aggressive actions
in their local countries when multinational companies (MNC) who are mutually
forbearing have a higher level of ownership in their local subsidiaries, and the cultural
distance between MNC’s home country and the subsidiary’s host country is closer. Such
research might reveal whether internal organization, combined with the competitive
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context of collaborative, have an impact on the governance of alliances and their
outcomes for partners.
Finally, it would also be valuable to carry out longitudinal analyses of firms’
competitive relationships and their collaborations. Whether on-going alliances are
affected by changes in firms’ incentives based on shifting market overlaps and factor
market competition is worthy of study. Given that my study has emphasized how firms’
competitive relationships influence alliance governance, it would also be valuable to
examine how firms’ investments in alliances potentially shape their subsequent
competitive behaviors. For instance, the accumulation of collaborative agreements
between two firms might promote tacit collusion and monopolistic rent-seeking in other
markets the partners share (Vonortas, 2000). Moreover, inasmuch as alliance termination
represents a loss in firms’ opportunities to deter competitive actions, this might also have
spillover effects in firms’ competitive relationships that future research could investigate.

3.6

Conclusion

In this paper, I theorized how mutual forbearance generated by multimarket contacts
between R&D alliance partners can curb opportunism in a collaborative agreement,
thereby enabling the partners to govern an alliance without resorting to hierarchical
governance structures. My main theoretical contribution lies in extending theory in the
multimarket competition literature to research on alliance governance, and I also showed
how certain conditions intensify or weaken the effects of multimarket contacts. Beyond
making specific contributions to the separate streams of research on alliances and
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multimarket competition, my paper joins them and more broadly aims to advance
knowledge on the interplay of competition and cooperation. Transcending the
conventional view that competition and cooperation are opposites or can undermine each
other, recent work has begun to connect the separate streams of research on competitive
strategy and cooperative strategy (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011; Gnyawali &
Madhavan, 2001; Khanna et al., 1998), though the interplay of competition and
cooperation remains a “particularly vexing organizational paradox” (Chen, 2008). My
theory and evidence on the alliance governance implications of multimarket contact
promote a novel view that competition can enhance transactional efficiency in governing
alliances under certain conditions, and I hope that this study encourages new research on
the ways in which competition shapes inter-firm cooperation and vice-versa.
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CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF PARTNERS’ GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ON
KNOWLEDGE LEAKAGE TO RIVALS

4.1

Introduction

Competition and cooperation are fundamental concepts in the field of strategy.
Despite their inherent interdependence, however, the research streams on the two
concepts have often developed separately, resulting in a lack of systematic
understanding on the interplay between them (Chen, 2008). For example, the alliance
literature has paid relatively little attention to the competitive context of
collaborations. The literature that has addressed this issue has been mainly interested
in knowledge protection concerns in alliances between direct rivals, as competition
between alliance partners might aggravate the risks of knowledge misappropriation.
Studies have investigated asymmetric learning between alliance partners (Hamel et
al., 1989), learning dynamics between alliance partners (Khanna et al., 1998), the
effects of competition between alliance partners on alliance scope (Oxley &
Sampson, 2004), and collaboration failure (Park & Russo, 1996).
However, even when an allying firm partners with a firm who is not a direct
rival (e.g., when a downstream firm collaborates with an upstream firm), the allying
firm might still have to pay close attention to knowledge protection concerns if
knowledge can be (1) unintentionally spilled over through the partner to the major
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rivals of the allying firm or (2) misappropriated jointly by the partner firm and rivals.
Some recent work has begun to investigate the risk of indirect ties to rivals. For
example, Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, and Hallen (2015) examined the negative effects
of competitive exposure to rivals via shared intermediary organizations (i.e., venture
capitalists). Similarly, Hernandez, Sanders, and Tuschke (2015) focused on
knowledge spillover concerns created when board interlocks result in indirect
connections to rival firms. I build upon and extend this work by suggesting that firms
must be concerned with more than just the formal relationships that create indirect
ties to rivals. Specifically, I draw upon agglomeration theory to suggest that colocation between an allying firm’s partner and major rivals of the allying firm
(“rivalry in partner location”) is an important but understudied factor affecting the
risk of knowledge loss and therefore carries implications for alliance governance and
design (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Pisano, 1989). My arguments are informed by prior
research in the geography of knowledge, especially in the agglomeration literature,
that has established knowledge spillovers are spatially restricted and represent a
significant feature of geographic clusters (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; A. B. Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993). Geographic proximity to rival firms also increases
the potential for knowledge misappropriation because proximity increases the
likelihood that the partner and a rival may form a relationship themselves
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Narula & Santangelo, 2009).
In this paper, I specifically investigate how incumbent firms address the risk
of rivals’ gaining access to firm knowledge in these situations. I theorize and
empirically corroborate that the allying firm mitigates these concerns when rivalry in
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partner location is higher by (1) using equity structures to provide enhanced
monitoring, control, and incentive alignment and (2) choosing less interdependent
R&D projects to reduce knowledge sharing and interactions. Furthermore, given that
actual competitive damage by knowledge leakage to rivals depends not only on the
amount of knowledge at risk of leakage but also on the rivals’ capabilities to take
advantage of the leaked knowledge, I further claim that the relationship between
rivalry in partner location and these defensive mechanisms will be intensified when
rivals surrounding the allying firm’s partner have greater absorptive capacity.
With my theory and results, I make several contributions to the alliance
literature and the agglomeration literature. First, I contribute to the literature on the
competitive aspects of collaborations by highlighting how an understudied but
interesting competitive issue, i.e., indirect links to rival firms resulting from the
geographic location of partners, affects governance choice and alliance design. There
has been a recent call for more research on the interplay between cooperation and
competition. Some alliance research has responded to this call, but it has focused
mainly on the effect of dyadic competitive relationships between alliance partners
(Khanna et al., 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996), and some
related literature has also considered the role of indirect ties that exist due to formal
relationships (Hernandez et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 2015). I enrich the literature on
the competitive aspects of collaborations by extending the scope of research inquiries
from dyadic and formal indirect ties to a broader set of competitive relationships that
affect collaborations.
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I also contribute to the alliance literature by suggesting conditions in which
incumbent firms address the competitive context of collaborations through their
alliance design choices. This extends prior work that has largely focused on how
technology ventures can protect themselves from their larger, more powerful
incumbent firm partners (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila, Rosenberger, &
Eisenhardt, 2008; Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014). The knowledge protection concerns
of incumbent firms remain relatively less explored, which is noteworthy because
these firms are also exposed to the risk of knowledge loss. My work explicates
geographic proximity between technology ventures and incumbents’ rivals as an
understudied factor affecting incumbent firms’ knowledge control concerns.
Finally, I also contribute to the agglomeration literature by adding new
theoretical arguments and findings to the research on the potential downsides or
drawbacks of agglomeration. Indeed, since Marshall's (1920) pioneering work, the
agglomeration literature has considered knowledge spillovers to be a key benefit
attracting firms to geographic clusters. Moreover, technology ventures located in
geographic clusters have been argued to be particularly attractive alliance partners
given their access to the cluster’s pool of knowledge spillovers (Rothaermel, 2002). I
highlight that partnering with these firms may also entail risks in cases where the
technology venture shares a location populated with rivals of the incumbent firm. In
this respect, my work is broadly similar in spirit to Shaver and Flyer (2000) in
highlighting the downsides of location in a geographic cluster as well as its benefits.
Although partnering with a technology firm in a cluster does provide access to the
pool of knowledge spillovers, it also increases the risk that the incumbent firm’s
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knowledge could spill out into that pool and be accessed by rivals. In these particular
situations, incumbent firms can respond by structuring the relationship to provide
better protection of its knowledge.

4.2

Theory and Hypotheses

4.2.1

Theoretical Background

Cooperation and Competition in R&D Alliances. The formation of research
and development (R&D) alliances between companies in high technology industries
is a common phenomenon, with a number of potential strategic and cost-economizing
motives driving their prevalence (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn,
2002). In addition to their potential benefits, however, these relationship raise
significant concerns related to the protection of technical knowledge because
achieving the objectives of an R&D alliance often requires firms to share valuable
knowledge. Accordingly, concern over knowledge leakage and misappropriation has
been a core theme of research in the alliance literature (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Oxley,
1997; Pisano, 1990). For example, since Hamel and colleagues (1989) pointed out
that asymmetric learning in cooperative ventures between U.S. and Japanese
competitors critically contributed to the latter’s global success over the former, the
research stream that Chen (2008) termed the “competition-oriented cooperation”
literature has emphasized the risks of knowledge leakage and misappropriation in
R&D alliances between rivals. For example, Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000)
argued and empirically corroborated that alliance partners who are direct competitors
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to each other have strong incentives to acquire partner capabilities and, as a result, are
more likely to reorganize or take over the alliance. In addition, based on the rationale
that end-market competition between alliance partners increases the pay-off from
free-riding or misappropriation, Oxley and Sampson (2004) claimed and showed that
alliance partners with market overlap tend to limit R&D alliance activities to R&D
alone rather than extend them to related manufacturing and/or marketing activities in
order to reduce knowledge losses.
Although the previous competition-oriented cooperation literature has focused
mostly on the dyadic competitive relationship between alliance partners, more recent
work has begun to extend the scope of inquiry from dyadic ties to a broader set of
relationships. This work recognizes that risks exist, even when not directly partnering
with rivals. For example, Mesquita, Anand, and Brush (2008) considered buyers’
sharing knowledge and developing new technologies with suppliers in vertical supply
alliances. They suggested that this knowledge was subject to use by partner suppliers
with other buyers and argued that focal buyers need to invest in partnership-specific
assets and capabilities and use relational governance mechanisms to address this risk.
Other research from outside the alliance context has highlighted that firm knowledge
may be exposed to rivals via other formal relationships that create indirect ties to
rivals. For example, Pahnke and colleagues (2015) investigated the situation where an
entrepreneurial firm is indirectly connected to rival firms via common venture
capitalists, showing that information leakage via these indirect ties to competitors
negatively affected entrepreneurial firms’ innovation activities. In addition,
Hernandez and colleagues (2015) examined the hazards of knowledge leakage to
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rivals via indirect ties formed by board interlock networks. The authors argued that
firms control such risks by terminating and avoiding ties that could create indirect
paths to rivals; they also address risks by embedding themselves in dense networks
where social monitoring is more prevalent. While this literature is not concerned with
interfirm collaboration per se, it highlights the point that firms should consider risks
not only from partnering directly with rivals but also from indirect competitive
relationships surrounding collaborations. I next explain how similar knowledge
concerns can arise from ties that exist even in the absence of formal relationships,
such as when partners are located in geographic proximity to rivals.
Geographic Co-location and Knowledge Protection Concerns. Knowledge
spillovers are more intense between spatially proximate firms relative to distant
counterparts. Geographic proximity enables face-to-face communication that is
critical to transferring tacit knowledge (Daft & Lengel, 1986). There has been a
substantial body of empirical research corroborating that geographic proximity fosters
knowledge spillovers. For instance, Jaffe and colleagues (1993) supported geographic
localization of knowledge spillovers by showing that patent citations are more likely
to come from the same state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) compared with
the pre-existing concentration of related research activity. Similarly, Rosenkopf and
Almeida (2003) noted a positive relationship between geographic proximity and
knowledge flows measured by patent citations in the semiconductor industry.
The benefits of localized knowledge spillovers have also been repeatedly
highlighted in the agglomeration literature as one of the key benefits of co-location in
a geographic cluster, which Porter (1998) defines as a geographically proximate
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group of interconnected firms and related institutions in a particular field. Co-location
in a cluster fosters knowledge spillovers not only due to geographic proximity but
also the formal and informal channels it provides. Firms co-located within a cluster
generally prefer in-cluster transactions and exchanges and thus tend to be formally
interconnected through, for example, licensing, technology partnerships, strategic
alliances, and supply contracts (McCann & Folta, 2011). In addition, clusters feature
informal channels of knowledge spillovers such as social meetings, trade meetings,
and interfirm mobility of workers (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Saxenian, 1996).
Although much of the agglomeration literature emphasizes the benefits of
access to knowledge spillovers, they also represent a risk to firms who possess
knowledge. Consistent with this view, Shaver and Flyer (2000) argued that firms with
better technologies or human capital would be less likely to locate in a cluster because
they contribute more to the pool of spillovers, which benefits rivals and reduces their
own relative advantages. This is because the knowledge that spills over to the
competitors is likely to be more valuable than the knowledge the firm itself obtains. I
contend a similar spillover concern arises via the indirect path of partnering. Given
that geographic proximity and co-location in a cluster facilitates knowledge
spillovers, an allying firm is prone to knowledge leakage to its rivals when its R&D
partner firm is co-located with more of the allying firm’s major rivals (henceforth,
“rivalry in partner location”). In particular, knowledge spillovers by informal
channels such as interpersonal networks and labor mobility can take place even when
the partner firm does not have any intention of misappropriation.
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Rivalry in partner location also raises the potential risks associated with
knowledge misappropriation. When partnering with firms who are not rivals, the
misappropriation concern is that partners may share the focal firm’s knowledge with
rivals. This concern is heightened when rivalry in partner location is higher, for two
reasons. First, co-location increases the likelihood that the partner firm may form a
future formal relationship with the allying firm’s rivals and jointly misappropriate the
allying firm’s knowledge, as geographic proximity has been demonstrated to promote
both alliances (Narula & Santangelo, 2009) and acquisitions (Chakrabarti & Mitchell,
2013; Narula & Santangelo, 2009). Second, the benefits of co-location noted above in
promoting transfer of tacit knowledge also apply to knowledge a partner elects to
misappropriate via transfer to rivals. In such cases, the effectiveness of the transfer is
enhanced due to the geographic co-location.
Prior to turning to my specific hypotheses regarding the mechanisms utilized
to address these concerns associated with rivalry in partner location, I explain my
choice of theoretical context. In the development of hypotheses below, I focus on a
situation where (1) an incumbent firm and an R&D, or technology, venture who are
not direct competitors enter into an R&D alliance and (2) the technology venture is
co-located with the incumbent firm’s major rivals. Although the risk created by
rivalry in partner location applies to some degree to all R&D alliances, I focus on
R&D alliances between technology ventures and incumbent firms for two important
reasons. First, because of liability of newness or smallness (Bruderl & Schussler,
1990; Stinchcombe, 1968) and the lack of downstream capabilities, first-order
knowledge leakage to technology ventures is less concerning to incumbent firms.
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However, second-order knowledge leakage to the incumbent firms’ rivals via
technology ventures could be substantially harmful because the rivals could
immediately take advantage of the leaked knowledge to undermine the incumbent
firms in product markets. Second, given my interest in mechanisms chosen to address
the risk associated with rivalry in partner location, it is important to examine
partnerships in which the partner exposed to the risk has the ability to influence the
structuring of the partnership. In R&D alliances between technology ventures and
incumbent firms, the latter typically have significant bargaining power and thus are
very likely to influence the design of the alliance (e.g., Mason & Drakeman, 2014). I
turn now to an explanation of the defense mechanisms that incumbent firms adopt
when facing higher risks of rivalry in partner location.

4.2.2 Hypotheses Development
Knowledge Protection and Choice of Equity as a Governance Mechanism.
Since knowledge is intangible, R&D partners have difficulty measuring and
monitoring each other’s behaviors and outcomes. In addition, R&D activities entail a
high level of uncertainty. These attributes of R&D alliances make it difficult to write
enforceable contractual agreements and accordingly participating firms are subject to
opportunistic behaviors (Oxley, 1997). As a remedy for such contractual hazards,
equity arrangements have long been suggested in the alliance literature. Equity
ownership helps align partners’ incentives (Williamson, 1991), delineates rights and
obligations between partners (Grossman & Hart, 1986), and also provides hierarchical
controls in the form of command structures, authority systems, standard operating
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procedures, dispute resolution procedures, and non-market pricing systems (Gulati &
Singh, 1998; Pisano, 1989). Equity participation in R&D alliances between
technology ventures and incumbent firms may take several forms, including minority
investment of the incumbent firm in the technology venture or the formation of a joint
venture. In both cases, I anticipate that the inclusion of equity in R&D alliances will
increase the incumbent firm’s ability to mitigate spillovers and misappropriation of its
knowledge to rivals co-located with the technology venture by enhancing monitoring,
control, and incentive alignment.
The inclusion of equity first fosters monitoring, as it provides greater access to
information. For example, equity investments often include representation on the
invested partner’s board. Board participation provides observational and/or voting
rights enabling the investing partner to better monitor its partner’s behavior, for
example the use of contributed assets and development of new assets (Kumar & Seth,
1998; Pisano, 1989). Enhanced monitoring allows the incumbent firm to limit the
amount of unnecessary information sharing with the technology venture. As less
unnecessary information is shared with the partner, the total knowledge that may spill
over to rivals or be misappropriated is reduced. Moreover, increased ability to
monitor fosters the early discovery of possible spillovers of knowledge, allowing the
incumbent firm to quickly take steps to address the situation in the event of
unintended knowledge spillovers.
Second, equity ownership provides greater control and influence for the
incumbent firm. For example, the incumbent firm’s existing ownership position gives
it preferential access should the technology venture desire to be acquired. Even if the
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incumbent firm elects not to acquire the technology venture itself, the incumbent firm
can use its voting rights try to block transactions between the technology venture and
the nearby rivals, such as R&D alliances and acquisitions (García-Canal, 1996;
Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Yan & Gray, 1994). Even when the incumbent firm’s voting
right may not be strong enough to veto an R&D alliance with or an acquisition by a
nearby rival, the incumbent firm’s ownership in the technology venture and its
intellectual property rights can help safeguard certain knowledge.
A third benefit of equity participation is that it can help align the incentives of
the partners and, as a result, prevent opportunistic behaviors. In general, equity
participation enhances incentive alignment mainly by two mechanisms. First, equity
participation penalizes opportunism through reductions in the value of equity holding
(Pisano, 1989: 112). Second, since shares of ownership reflect relative contributions
of each partner, the alliance partners are incentivized to make the requisite ex ante
commitments and thus the risk of reneging on a future commitment is attenuated
(Pisano, 1989: 112).
Given these monitoring, control, and incentive alignment benefits from equity
arrangements, an incumbent firm will turn to equity arrangements to a larger extent
when it faces a higher level of risk for knowledge acquisition by its rivals via its
partners. When an incumbent firm collaborates with a technology venture, the risk of
knowledge spillovers to and misappropriation by the major rivals of the incumbent
firm increases as the technology venture is surrounded by more of the incumbent
firm’s major rivals. Therefore, as the degree of rivalry in partner location increases,
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the incumbent firm will have a greater need for the monitoring, control, and incentive
alignment benefits that equity arrangements offer. Therefore, I posit:
Hypothesis 1. The greater the degree of rivalry in partner location, the
greater the likelihood the R&D alliance is equity-based.

Knowledge Protection and Choice of Interdependence Level. In the previous
section, I discussed the usage of equity-based governance structures to address
knowledge protection concerns. In addition to such governance decisions, however,
the alliance literature has also suggested other alliance design decisions that can be
responsive to firms’ concerns about rivalry in partner location.
In particular, a critical aspect of alliance design related to partners’ tasks and
interactions is the level of interdependence (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Thompson, 1967;
Van De Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). Viewing organizations as information
processing systems facing uncertainty, Tushman and Nadler (1978) posited that the
amount of task interdependence between subunits increases the need for effective
coordination and joint problem solving; this heightened need for interaction then
increases work-related uncertainty and, as a result, required information processing.
Similarly, focusing on the context of alliances, Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven
(2006) argued that high interdependence between alliance partners requires them to
share valuable knowledge-intensive resources. Therefore, if the tasks in an R&D
alliance between an incumbent firm and a technology venture are interdependent,
they have to share more knowledge between them and, therefore, are exposed to a
larger risk of knowledge leakage.
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Indeed, the alliance literature has paid substantial attention to interdependence
between alliance partners, but interdependence has typically been considered as a
given task attribute affecting governance choice rather than a decision variable that
alliance partners have to consider (Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011; Gulati &
Singh, 1998). However, alliance partners can decide the level of interdependence by
choosing different types of interdependence for their R&D collaborations. Thompson
(1967) classified the types of interdependence based on input-output relationships.
The types of interdependence are pooled, sequential, and reciprocal in order of
increasing complexity. Pooled interdependence refers to no direct input-output
relationship between subunits; that is, each subunit performs completely separate
functions. Sequential interdependence occurs when the output of one unit’s activity is
necessary for the performance by the next subunit, just as in an assembly line.
Reciprocal interdependence is similar to sequential interdependence in that the output
of one subunit becomes the input of another, but is different from and more complex
than sequential interdependence in that the input-output relationship is reciprocal.
Increasing levels of interdependence require closer working relationships and
more knowledge transfer, which also increases the amount of knowledge that may
leak to transaction partners. Larger amounts of transferred and leaked knowledge
increase the risks this knowledge may be acquired by nearby rivals. I therefore expect
the incumbent firm’s choice of interdependence to be associated with the degree of
threat of knowledge acquisition by rivals. Because geographic co-location increases
the risks of knowledge leakage by both spillovers and misappropriation, the
incumbent firm faces a higher risk of knowledge acquisition by rivals as the
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technology venture is co-located with more of the incumbent firm’s major rivals.
Accordingly, I predict that the incumbent firm will need to choose a lower level of
task interdependence to curb knowledge transfers and interactions in order to reduce
the potential risk as the nearby rivals around the technology venture are more serious
competitors to the incumbent firm. Therefore, I posit:
Hypothesis 2. The greater the degree of rivalry in partner location, the lower
the interdependence of the R&D alliance.

4.2.3

Moderating Effects of Nearby Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity

So far, I have argued that when the degree of rivalry in partner location is
high, the incumbent firm chooses equity-based governance structures and less
interdependent R&D activities for the alliance to reduce the amount of its knowledge
at risk of leakage to nearby rivals. However, the potential competitive damage by
knowledge leakage to nearby rivals depends not only on the exposure created by
geographic co-location with partners, but also on the nearby rivals’ capabilities to
value, assimilate, and apply the knowledge leaked to them; that is, the rivals’
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) magnifies the risk of rivalry in partner
locations. Thus, I wish to consider how that relationship between rivalry in partner
location and the choice of governance structures and task interdependence is
conditioned on the nearby rivals’ absorptive capacity.
Firms with higher absorptive capacity are able to benefit more from external
knowledge, resulting in higher innovation rates (Tsai, 2001). One such form of
external knowledge is the pool of spillovers from co-located firms. As just one
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example in the context of agglomeration, McCann and Folta (2011) showed that firms
with higher absorptive capacity are better able to absorb and benefit from knowledge
spillovers in clusters in the U.S. biotechnology industry. Given the important role of
absorptive capacity in applying knowledge, I expect that rivalry in partner location
will be less of a concern when rival absorptive capacity is low. The risk of incumbent
firm knowledge spilling over from its partners is low when rivals have little ability to
assimilate and apply that knowledge to compete against the incumbent firm in end
markets. By contrast, when rival absorptive capacity is higher, rivalry in partner
location will be a more serious concern since the rivals have an ability to assimilate
and apply the knowledge to which they have been exposed. Given the heightened
risks of rivalry in partner location under these conditions, incumbent firms become
even more likely to (1) choose equity-based governance structures to benefit from the
monitoring, control, and incentive alignment that equity arrangements provide and (2)
further limit knowledge sharing by reducing task interdependence. Therefore, I posit:
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of rivalry in partner location on the
likelihood of equity-based alliance governance will be more
pronounced as the rivals have higher absorptive capacity.

Hypothesis 4. The negative effect of rivalry in partner location on
interdependence in R&D alliances will be more pronounced as
the rivals have higher absorptive capacity.
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4.3

4.3.1

Methods

Data and Sample

I chose R&D alliances between technology ventures and incumbent firms in
the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry as my research setting for several reasons. First,
the this industry is characterized by significant agglomeration (Folta et al., 2006).
Because I focus on co-location between technology ventures and incumbent firms’
rivals as a theoretical factor underlying incumbent firms’ knowledge concerns, I need
an empirical setting where firms agglomerate. Second, R&D alliances between
technology ventures and incumbent firms are regarded as beneficial for both and thus
are frequently observed in the industry, just as these collaborations present knowledge
leakage and misappropriation concerns (Pisano, 1990). Third, markets are very
clearly defined by therapeutic classes in this industry (Anand et al., 2009). In this
study, clear market definitions are important because firms defined to be an
incumbent firm’s major rivals should be actual, meaningful competitors whose
products are substitutes for those of the incumbent firm.
For the alliance data, I drew on Thomson Reuters’ Recap database, which is
known as one of the most robust and representative data sources on alliances in the
biopharmaceutical industry (Schilling, 2009) and includes detailed information on
alliance governance and design. To define incumbent firm partners’ rivals, I relied on
the IMS Health database, which provides prescription drug sales by therapeutic class
for biopharmaceutical companies around the world. I also used the IMS Health
database to ensure that the technology ventures in my sample are R&D-dedicated
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firms without presence in product markets. For patent data, I used patent data from
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
Because of my interest in the location characteristics of the technology
venture partner, I focused on R&D alliances involving U.S.-based biotechnology
ventures; the incumbent firm partners include both U.S. and foreign firms. Also,
because I am interested only in rivals adjacent to U.S.-based biotechnology ventures,
incumbent firm partners’ rivals are all U.S. firms. In the Recap database, there were
1,242 R&D alliances between U.S. biotechnology ventures and incumbent
pharmaceutical firms between 2007 and 2013.

4.3.2

Measures

Dependent variables. In this paper, I investigate how incumbent firms prevent
their knowledge from being acquired by their major rivals located within the same
area as their technology venture partners. Because I focus on two defense
mechanisms, choice of (1) governance structures and (2) interdependence level, I
have two different dependent variables. The first dependent variable, Equity Alliance,
is a dichotomous variable coded one if a focal R&D alliance between an incumbent
firm and a technology venture is equity-based, i.e., either minority equity investment
or joint venture, and zero otherwise (Gulati, 1995b; Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996; Li et
al., 2012; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Phene & Tallman, 2012; Pisano, 1989; Robinson
& Stuart, 2007). Out of the 1,242 R&D alliances, 84 (6.8%) were equity-based
alliances while the remaining 1,158 (93.2%) were non-equity alliances.
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My second dependent variable is a binary variable, Reciprocal
Interdependence, which distinguishes the level of task independence between an
incumbent firm and a technology venture. The variable takes the value of one if a
focal R&D alliance is coded as “Collaboration” or “Co-Development” in Recap. This
database categorizes an R&D agreement in one of these categories when both parties
jointly participate in the research and development, and the combined participation of
both partners in R&D activities implies reciprocal input-output relationships. Recap
codes agreements as “Research” or “Development” if only one of the parties performs
research or development, leaving the other downstream activities to the other party.
These agreements fall into the category of sequential interdependence because the
research output of one party (i.e., technology venture) is the input of an activity in
another unit (i.e., incumbent firm). Reciprocal interdependence (the categories of
Collaboration and Co-Development) implies stronger interdependence than sequential
interdependence (Thompson, 1967) and thus Reciprocal Interdependence reflects the
level of task interdependence between R&D partners consistent with Thompson’s
(1967) definitions. Because R&D alliances require at least some minimal level of
input-output relationship, Thompson’s (1967) third category of pooled
interdependence does not apply to my sample of alliances. 47% of the alliances in my
sample were classified as involving reciprocal interdependence.
Independent variables. My core independent variable captures the intensity
of firm-level product market competition between an incumbent firm partner and its
major rivals located in the same geographic area as its technology venture partner.
For this purpose, I developed a variable labeled Rivalry in Partner Location. For this
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measure, I first identified the top 10 rivals of a particular incumbent firm, based on
total revenues in the product markets in which the incumbent firm is present. In
identifying these rivals, I followed the product-market definitions provided by IMS
Health, which consists of 338 therapeutic classes. Then, I checked which top 10 rivals
of the incumbent firm are located in the same geographic cluster as the technology
venture.10 To define geographic clusters, I used Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs). In the agglomeration literature, different levels of aggregation have been
used to identify clusters. My definition of clusters should be aligned with the distance
with which the benefits of knowledge spillovers might meaningfully extend. Since
Jaffe and colleagues (1993) found that localization of knowledge spillovers was
stronger at the MSA level than at the U.S. state level, I elected to use the former. This
aggregation level is also consistent with prior studies of agglomeration in the
biotechnology industry (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Folta et al., 2006). Focusing on
the top 10 rivals located in the same MSA as the technology venture partner, I
calculated the weighted average of the aggregate market shares held by the rivals. As
a weight for a certain market, I used the importance of the market to the incumbent
firm, which is calculated by the ratio of the incumbent firm’s revenue from the
product market to its total revenue as follows (please see Appendix A for an
example):

i: Incumbent Firm
10

In the few cases in which a focal R&D alliance is a joint venture, I used the location of the joint
venture instead of the location of the technology venture. Inclusion or exclusion of joint ventures from
the sample did not affect the interpretation of the results.
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j: Incumbent Firm i's Technology Venture partner
m: Product markets in which Incumbent Firm i is present
r: Incumbent Firm i's top 10 rival located within the same Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) as Technology Venture j
MSrm: The market share of top 10 rival r in product market m.
I also examine how the nearby rivals’ absorptive capacity shapes the effects of
the co-location between the incumbent firm’s major rivals and its technology venture
partner on the governance structure and task interdependence in the R&D alliance. To
measure the nearby rivals’ absorptive capacity, I used the number of patents that (1)
are issued to the nearby rivals, (2) belong to the three-digit, biotechnology-related
patent classes, i.e., 424, 435, 436, 514, 530 (Granstrand, Patel, & Pavitt, 1997; Phene,
Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Marsh, 2006) and (3) belong to the three-digit patent classes in
which the incumbent firm has at least one patent. Some incumbent firms in the
biopharmaceutical industry also have their businesses in chemical industries and
patent in very diverse areas. However, because I focus on the nearby rivals’
absorptive capacity relevant to the incumbent firm’s biotechnology-related
knowledge, I applied the three criteria above.
Control variables. I controlled for a number of additional factors that the
previous literature has argued to affect knowledge misappropriation and spillover
concerns and therefore could affect alliance governance and design. First, to control
for transaction-level attributes that may influence contractual hazards, I included the
research stage and scope of the R&D alliance. In the industry, new drug development
is typically categorized into discovery, lead molecule, formulation, preclinical,
clinical phases I/II/III, and FDA approval phases. Early Stage takes the value of one
if an R&D alliance belongs to one of the first four phases and zero otherwise. In
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addition, alliance scope has also been known as a factor influencing the risk of
misappropriation (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Therefore, I also included a dummy
variable, Alliance Scope, to indicate the breadth of alliance scope. Alliance Scope was
coded one if an R&D alliance includes downstream activities, i.e., either
manufacturing or marketing, and zero otherwise.
The alliance literature has argued that social networks in which alliance
partners are embedded provide controls for opportunistic behaviors and thus might
also affect the risk of knowledge losses as well as the alliance design choices firms
make (Jones et al., 1997). Following Rothaermel and Boeker (2008), I controlled for
an alliance dyad’s social embeddedness, using variables to capture the partners’ prior
ties, indirect ties between the two firms in the dyad, and each partner’s degree
network centrality. To construct Prior Ties, I counted the number of prior alliances
between the two partners in the past ten years. For Indirect Ties, I counted the number
of indirect ties between the two partners at degree distance two, using all the alliances
reported in Recap to represent the entire network in the biopharmaceutical industry as
much as possible (Powell et al., 1996). As a proxy for each partner’s positional
embeddedness (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), I constructed Degree
Centrality of Incumbent Firm (Technology Venture), using the total number of ties the
incumbent firm (technology venture) had entered within the entire industry network
in the past ten years. To ensure that the measure of degree centrality is independent
from the relational embeddedness between the two partners, I excluded the prior ties
between them in measuring each partner’s degree centrality.
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I also included some other firm-level attributes that may affect my dependent
variables and be related to the risk of knowledge losses to rivals. The alliance
literature has claimed that when alliance partners are asymmetric in size, they tend to
have more conflicts (Li et al., 2012). Therefore, a small technology venture may need
better incentive alignment which equity investment can provide when it partners with
a larger incumbent firm. Also, a larger incumbent firm may have more resources to
buy equity stakes in a technology venture. To control these effects, I included in the
model the prescription drug sales of the incumbent firm in a given dyad, i.e., Size of
Incumbent Firm (Gimeno, 2004). Firms with significant knowledge bases may be
more concerned about knowledge leakage and accordingly prefer equity-based R&D
alliances to a larger extent to protect their knowledge (Phene & Tallman, 2012). To
control for these effects, I constructed Patent Counts of Incumbent Firm and Patent
Counts of Technology Venture.
The agglomeration literature has argued that geographic clusters are
characterized by dense interpersonal and interfirm social networks within them
(Saxenian, 1996). For this reason, social capital based on dense networks within a
cluster may provide control functions. To control this effect, I included Cluster Size,
which was measured by the number of biopharmaceutical companies in the MSA in
which the technology venture in a given dyad is located. Research on geographic
distance between alliance partners has also maintained that geographic proximity
reduces information asymmetry between alliance partners and can also facilitate
monitoring (McCann, Reuer, & Lahiri, 2015; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014). Therefore, I
included in the model the distance between an incumbent firm and a technology
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venture in a given dyad. Since the effect of distance might diminish beyond some
level, particularly in international deals, I also used the natural log of the variable as a
robustness check and obtained consistent results.
I included three different types of fixed effects to capture other sources of
heterogeneity. The risk of knowledge leakage and misappropriation may be
influenced by the types of technologies and diseases for a focal R&D project.
Therefore, I included technological domain fixed effects and disease fixed effects in
the model. Finally, year fixed effects were also included to capture any broader,
economy-wide factors affecting the decisions on governance structures and task
interdependence made by alliance partners.

4.3.3

Statistical Techniques

Since my dependent variables, Equity Alliance and Reciprocal
Interdependence, are binary, I elected to use probit regression as my main model.
Because governance structures and task interdependence may be decided jointly and
may be correlated I also used bivariate probit models as a robustness check. Lastly, I
also tested my hypotheses with Heckman probit models to control for potential
selection bias. Because my sample consists of realized alliance deals only, the dyads
in my sample may be systematically different from the other possible unrealized
dyads and thus selection bias may be a concern. To construct the set of
counterfactuals of unrealized alliance deals, I considered all possible dyads for each
year (from 2007 to 2013) using all the incumbent firms and technology ventures who
formed R&D alliances in each year. In the first-stage model, I used the number of
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alliances the top 10 rivals of a given incumbent firm had formed in the previous year
to predict formation of an alliance. If its rivals were active in forming alliances in the
previous year, the incumbent firm is more likely to seek alliances in the following
year as a competitive response (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993) or as an
institutional mimetic behavior (Fligstein, 1985). Consistent with these arguments,
Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) noted that the propensity of firms to form alliances is
greatly influenced by the frequency of alliance formation by other firms in the same
strategic group in the global automobile industry. However, it is unlikely to be
related to its choice of alliance structures and task interdependence, so this variable is
likely to be valid in predicting alliance formation in selection models.

4.4

Results

Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the variables
used in the analyses. Although many pairs of variables in Table 1 show significant
pairwise correlations, multicollinearity is not a serious issue in my models. Degree
Centrality of Incumbent Firm had the highest value of variance inflation factor (6.56),
but is still below the recommended cutoff level of 10 (Neter et al., 1996).
Table 4.2 presents the results of the models analyzing the probability that a
particular R&D alliance is equity-based or includes highly interdependent tasks.
Model 1 is a base model including control variables only, and Model 2 introduces
Rivalry in Partner Location to test my first hypothesis. The significant positive
coefficient on Rivalry in Partner Location (b=1.76 and p=0.026) supports Hypothesis
1 and indicates that as the intensity of competition between an incumbent firm and its
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major rivals co-located with its technology venture partner increases, the likelihood
increases that the R&D alliance is equity-based rather than a non-equity transaction.
To evaluate the economic significance of the effect, I estimated the predicted average
probability of equity alliances at various values of Rivalry in Partner Location. That
is, I calculated the response for each observation and then averaged those responses at
the median, top 10%, top 5%, and top 1% quantiles of the variable given its highly
skewed distribution (Hoetker, 2007; Train, 1986). The predicted average probabilities
were 6.05%, 8.59%, 10.69%, and 18.24% respectively. That is, when the value of
Rivalry in Partner Location increases from the median to top 10%, top 5%, and top
1%, the predicted average probability increases by 41.77%, 76.47%, and 200.07%
respectively. To mitigate a potential concern of outliers driving the effect, I reran
Model 2 using the natural log of the variable plus one, and I obtained a consistent
interpretation in support of H1 (b=2.17 and p=0.022).
Models 3 and 4 test my second hypothesis on rivalry in partner location as a
determinant of interdependence as a dimension of alliance design. Model 3 includes
control variables as a base model and Model 4 adds my core independent variable,
Rivalry in Partner Location. Since the coefficient of the variable in Model 4 is
negative and significant (b= -1.55 and p=0.011), Hypothesis 2 is also supported since
rivalry in partner location reduces the likelihood of designing an alliance with highly
interdependent R&D tasks. To assess economic significance, I again estimated the
predicted average probability of reciprocal interdependence at the four values of the
independent variable as above and obtained 48.78%, 42.43%, 38.24%, and 27.58%
respectively. Compared to the predicted value at median, the last three values
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represent decrease the likelihood of reciprocity by 13.03%, 21.61%, and 43.46%
respectively. Given the skewness of the rivalry in partner location variable, I also
reran Model 4 using the natural log of the variable plus one and again obtained a
consistent result (b= -1.87 and p=0.009).
Model 5-8 in Table 4.2 show the results related to the moderating effects of
rivals’ absorptive capacity. Model 6 and 8 include Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity and its
interaction term with Rivalry in Partner Location to test Hypotheses 3 and 4,
respectively. Although the coefficient estimate for the interaction term in Model 6
was positive as predicted, it was insignificant (b= 0.0014 and p=0.382) and thus
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. However, the interaction term had a negative and
significant coefficient in Model 8 (b =-0.003 and p=0.038), supporting Hypothesis 4.
Therefore, rivals’ absorptive capacity does not significantly intensify the positive
effect of rivalry in partner location on the likelihood of equity alliance, but it does
significantly strengthen the negative effect of rivalry in partner location on the
likelihood of reciprocal interdependence. Although the interpretation of the relevant
coefficients supports Hypothesis 4, the effect—and even the sign—of an interaction
can also change depending on the coefficients of the composite variables and the
values of all of the variables in probit models (Hoetker, 2007). In Figure 4.1,
therefore, I provide a graphical depiction of the interaction effect. Specifically, I
compare the negative slopes between rivalry in partner location and the probability of
reciprocal interdependence when the values of Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity are fixed
at the mean, mean plus one standard deviation, and mean plus two standard
deviations, respectively. The slope becomes steeper as the value of Rivals’ Absorptive
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Capacity increases, supporting the moderation argument in H4. To estimate the
economic significance of the moderating effects, I estimated the decreases in the
probability of reciprocal interdependence caused by the value increase in Rivalry in
Partner Location from the median to top 5%, when Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity is
fixed at the mean, the mean plus one standard deviation, and the mean plus two
standard deviation. With Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity fixed at the mean, an increase
of Rivalry in Partner Location from the median to top 5% decreases the probability of
reciprocal interdependence from 49.38% to 43.40% (i.e., decrease by 12.11%).
However, the same increase in Rivalry in Partner Location decreases the same
probability from 52.85% to 41.02% (i.e., decrease by 22.38%) and 56.30% to 38.68%
(i.e., decrease by 31.31%) when Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity is fixed at the mean plus
one standard deviation and at the mean plus two standard deviation respectively.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables
(1) Equity Alliance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

1

(2) Reciprocal Interdependence

0.04

1

(3) Rivalry in Partner Location

0.06

-0.05

1

(4) Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity

0.03

-0.06

0.61

1

(5) Early Stage

0.03

0.28

0.04

-0.03

1

(6) Alliance Scope

0.00

-0.05

0.02

-0.01

-0.17

1

(7) Prior Ties

-0.05

-0.04

0.00

0.04

0.05

0.00

1

(8) Indirect Ties

-0.04

0.00

0.10

0.08

0.03

-0.03

0.32

1

(9) Degree Centrality of Incumbent Firm

0.00

0.06

0.00

0.05

0.12

-0.12

0.07

0.29

1

(10) Degree Centrality of Technology Venture

-0.07

-0.02

0.11

0.06

-0.01

0.02

0.21

0.55

0.02

1

(11) Size of Incumbent Firm

0.00

0.04

0.02

0.03

0.14

-0.14

0.02

0.20

0.83

0.00

1

(12) Patent Counts of Incumbent Firm

-0.01

0.05

0.05

0.04

0.07

0.00

0.02

0.13

0.27

0.07

0.30

1

(13) Patent Counts of Technology Venture

-0.02

0.03

-0.01

-0.02

-0.03

-0.01

0.07

0.04

0.03

0.07

0.00

0.02

1

(14) Cluster Size

0.01

-0.04

0.63

0.69

0.00

0.04

0.04

0.05

-0.04

0.11

-0.05

0.02

-0.03

1

(15) Distance (Ln)

0.00

0.01

-0.19

-0.23

-0.05

0.00

0.01

0.01

-0.08

-0.02

-0.04

-0.01

-0.01

-0.14

1

Mean

0.07

0.47

0.03

122.4

0.38

0.16

0.11

0.74

87.30

9.96

15.50

150.5

70.41

61.37

9,160

Standard Deviation

0.25

0.50

0.08

300.4

0.49

0.36

0.49

2.31

89.14

25.57

17.90

301.9

917.6

58.72

2,055

Min

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

520.7

Max

1

1

0.65

1,974

1

1

10

38

322

282

61.8

5,587

31,323

214

15,491

Note: N=1,242. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at least at 0.05 level.
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Table 4.2. Probit Model Results
Model
(1)

(2)
H1
Equity
Alliance

(3)

(4)

H2
Reciprocal
Variables
Interdependence
Rivalry in Partner Location
1.76**
-1.55**
(0.79)
(0.61)
Early Stage
0.05
0.03
0.78*** 0.79***
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Alliance Scope
-0.05
-0.06
0.09
0.10
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.11)
(0.11)
Direct Ties
-0.40
-0.37
-0.23** -0.24***
(0.28)
(0.28)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Indirect Ties
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.01
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Degree Centrality of I.F.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Degree Centrality of T.V.
-0.03***
-0.03***
-0.00
-0.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Size of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of T.V.
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Cluster Size
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Distance
-0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Constant
-2.12***
-2.15***
-0.47**
-0.45**
(0.39)
(0.39)
(0.22)
(0.22)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-273.8
-271.8
-772.2
-769.2
Wald Chi-squared
101.3***
107.8*** 162.1*** 167.3***
Pseudo R2
0.109
0.116
0.101
0.104
Observations
1,242
1,242
1,242
1,242
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F.
refers to incumbenf firm while T.V. technology venture.
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Table 4.2. Continued
Model
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

H3
H4
Equity
Reciprocal
Variables
Alliance
Interdependence
Rivalry in Partner Location (1)
1.69**
1.25
-1.50**
-0.52
(0.81)
(0.96)
(0.65)
(0.78)
Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity (2)
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Interaction Term: (1) × (2)
0.00
-0.003**
(0.00)
(0.001)
Early Stage
0.03
0.04
0.79*** 0.79***
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Alliance Scope
-0.05
-0.06
0.09
0.10
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.11)
(0.11)
Direct Ties
-0.37
-0.38
-0.24*** -0.24***
(0.28)
(0.28)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Indirect Ties
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.01
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Degree Centrality of I.F.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Degree Centrality of T.V.
-0.03***
-0.03***
-0.00
-0.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Size of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of T.V.
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Cluster Size
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Distance
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Constant
-2.16***
-2.12***
-0.44** -0.52**
(0.39)
(0.39)
(0.23)
(0.23)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-271.7
-271.4
-769.1
-767.1
Wald Chi-squared
107.9***
110.6*** 167.6*** 169.3***
Pseudo R2
0.116
0.117
0.104
0.107
Observations
1,242
1,242
1,242
1,242
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F.
refers to incumbenf firm while T.V. technology venture.
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Probablity(Reciprocal Interdependence)
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0.4
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Rivalry in Partner Location
At the mean of Rivals' Absorptive Capacity
At the mean + 1 S.D. of Rivals' Absorptive Capacity
At the mean + 2 S.D. of Rivals' Absorptive Capacity

Figure 4.1 Moderating effects of rivals’ absorptive capacity

0.35

0.4
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4.4.1

Robustness Checks

Table 4.3 presents the results of robustness analyses using bivariate probit
models. The Wald chi-square tests did not reject the null that the correlation in
disturbances is zero in all the models, indicating that unobserved factors do not have
correlated influences on the two decisions. The results from bivariate probit models,
which are known to be more efficient than those from the probit models that are
estimated separately, also lead to the same interpretations as those presented above.
Table 4 shows the results from Heckman probit models. In the first-stage selection
model (Model 1), the coefficient of the number of alliances rival firms had formed in
one year prior to a focal year (Rivals’ Num. of Alliances (t-1)) is positive and
significant (b=0.01 and p=0.000), supporting the appropriateness of the variable as an
instrument. Since the Wald chi-square tests did not reject the null that the correlation
between the error term in the selection stage and that in the outcome stage is zero, I
concluded that selection bias is not significant in my sample. Furthermore, the results
from the Heckman probit models again provided consistent results with those from
probit models.
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Table 4.3. Bivariate Probit Model Results
Model
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

H1 & H2
Reciprocal
Reciprocal
Equity
InterdepEquity
InterdepVariables
Alliance
endence
Alliance
endence
Rivalry in Partner Location
1.76**
-1.55**
(0.79)
(0.61)
Early Stage
0.05
0.78***
0.03
0.79***
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.13)
(0.09)
Alliance Scope
-0.05
0.09
-0.06
0.10
(0.17)
(0.11)
(0.17)
(0.11)
Direct Ties
-0.40
-0.23**
-0.38
-0.24***
(0.29)
(0.09)
(0.28)
(0.09)
Indirect Ties
0.04
0.01
0.04
0.01
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.02)
Degree Centrality of I.F.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Degree Centrality of T.V.
-0.03***
-0.00
-0.03***
-0.00
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
Size of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of I.F.
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of T.V.
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Cluster Size
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Distance
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Constant
-2.11***
-0.47**
-2.14***
-0.45**
(0.38)
(0.22)
(0.38)
(0.22)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-1045.4
-1040.2
Wald Chi-squared
279.8***
287.2***
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1)
1.42
1.79
(p-value)
(p=0.23)
(p=0.18)
Observations
1,242
1,242
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F.
refers to incumbenf firm while T.V. technology venture.
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Table 4.3. Continued
Model
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

H3 & H4
Reciprocal
Reciprocal
Equity
InterdepEquity
InterdepVariables
Alliance
endence
Alliance
endence
Rivalry in Partner Location (1)
1.68**
-1.49**
1.23
-0.51
(0.81)
(0.65)
(0.96)
(0.78)
Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity (2)
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Interaction Term: (1) × (2)
0.00
-0.003**
(0.00)
(0.001)
Early Stage
0.03
0.79***
0.04
0.79***
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.13)
(0.09)
Alliance Scope
-0.05
0.09
-0.06
0.10
(0.17)
(0.11)
(0.17)
(0.11)
Direct Ties
-0.38
-0.24***
-0.38
-0.24***
(0.28)
(0.09)
(0.29)
(0.09)
Indirect Ties
0.04
0.01
0.04
0.01
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.02)
Degree Centrality of I.F.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Degree Centrality of T.V.
-0.03***
-0.00
-0.03***
-0.00
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
Size of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of I.F.
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of T.V.
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Cluster Size
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Distance
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Constant
-2.15***
-0.44**
-2.10***
-0.52**
(0.38)
(0.23)
(0.39)
(0.23)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-1040.0
-1037.7
Wald Chi-squared
288.1***
289.3***
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1)
1.81
2.03
(p-value)
(p=0.18)
(p=0.15)
Observations
1,242
1,242
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F.
refers to incumbenf firm while T.V. technology venture.
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Table 4.4. Heckman Probit Model Results
Model
(1)
Selection

Variables
Rivalry in Partner Location
Early Stage
Alliance Scope
Direct Ties
Indirect Ties
Degree Centrality of I.F.
Degree Centrality of T.V.
Size of I.F.
Patent Counts of I.F.
Patent Counts of T.V.
Cluster Size
Distance
Constant
Rivals’ Num. of Alliances (t-1)
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.41***
(0.04)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-2.39***
(0.06)
0.01***
(0.00)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Outcome
H1
Equity
Alliance
1.59**
(0.72)
0.04
0.02
(0.11)
(0.12)
-0.05
-0.05
(0.15)
(0.16)
-0.51*
-0.49*
(0.26)
(0.26)
0.03
0.03
(0.04)
(0.04)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
-0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.74
-0.83
(0.99)
(1.00)

H2
Reciprocal
Interdependence
-1.49**
(0.59)
0.74***
0.76***
(0.10)
(0.10)
0.08
0.09
(0.10)
(0.10)
-0.32*** -0.33***
(0.10)
(0.10)
0.00
0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00**
-0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.40
0.42
(0.62)
(0.62)

-0.48
-0.46
-0.32
-0.33
(0.32)
(0.32)
(0.23)
(0.23)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-6,100.7
-6,373.6 -6,371.7
-6,871.9
-6,868.9
Wald Chi-squared
1187.6*** 110.1*** 114.5*** 156.6*** 159.4***
2
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ (1)
2.24
2.05
1.98
1.97
(p-value)
(p=0.13) (p=0.15) (p=0.16) (p=0.16)
Observations
90,659
90,659
90,659
90,659
90,659
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
Selection model for the realized alliance deals are the same for all the outcome models. I.F. refers to
incumbenf firm while T.V. technology venture.
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Table 4.4. Continued
Model
(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Outcome
H3
H4
Equity
Reciprocal
Variables
Alliance
Interdependence
Rivalry in Partner Location (1)
1.53**
1.12
-1.43**
-0.49
(0.74)
(0.87)
(0.63)
(0.74)
Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity (2)
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Interaction Term: (1) × (2)
0.00
-0.003**
(0.00)
(0.001)
Early Stage
0.02
0.03
0.75*** 0.75***
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Alliance Scope
-0.05
-0.05
0.09
0.10
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Direct Ties
-0.49*
-0.49*
-0.33*** -0.33***
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Indirect Ties
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.01
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Degree Centrality of I.F.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Degree Centrality of T.V.
-0.03***
-0.03***
-0.00
-0.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Size of I.F.
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00*
-0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of I.F.
-0.00*
-0.00*
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Patent Counts of T.V.
-0.00
-0.00
0.00*
0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Cluster Size
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Distance
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Constant
-0.85
-0.80
0.43
0.37
(1.00)
(1.00)
(0.62)
(0.63)
Inverse Mills Ratio
-0.46
-0.46
-0.33
-0.33
(0.32)
(0.32)
(0.23)
(0.23)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Disease Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood
-6,371.6
-6,371.3 -6,868.8 -6,866.8
Wald Chi-squared
114.8*** 117.6*** 159.5*** 160.4***
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1)
2.01
2.06
1.98
2.04
(p-value)
(p=0.16)
(p=0.15) (p=0.16) (p=0.15)
Observations
90,659
90,659
90,659
90,659
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests.
Selection model for the realized alliance deals are the same for all the outcome models.

129
4.5

Discussion

In this paper, I theorize and corroborate that the governance structure and task
interdependence of an R&D alliance between an incumbent firm and a technology
venture is influenced by the characteristics of the technology venture’s location. More
specifically, I argue that when the technology venture is co-located with major rivals
of the incumbent firm, the incumbent firm faces a higher risk of knowledge leakage
to rivals by unintentional knowledge spillovers from the technology venture to the
nearby rivals as well as joint misappropriation by the technology venture and the
nearby rivals. This higher risk increases the need for knowledge protection and thus
makes the incumbent firm more likely to respond by using an equity governance
structure and reducing task interdependence. Furthermore, I also claim that the
absorptive capacity of the nearby rivals aggravates the risk of the nearby rivals’
gaining access to the incumbent firm knowledge, intensifying the effect of rivalry in
partner location on the incumbent firm’s protective alliance design decisions.
Empirical analyses based on 1,242 R&D alliances between technology ventures and
incumbent firms in the biopharmaceutical industry broadly support my arguments.

4.5.1

Contributions and Implications

My theory and evidence make several contributions to the alliance literature
as well as to the agglomeration literature. My most immediate contribution to the
alliance literature lies in building upon and extending the competition-oriented
cooperation literature that investigates the competitive aspects of collaborations and
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potential downsides of partnering with rivals (Hamel et al., 1989; Khanna et al., 1998;
Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996). This literature that had paid attention
to dyadic competitive relationships, and related research has just recently begun to
consider the threats of knowledge leakage to rivals via indirect links such as through
common suppliers, shared intermediary organizations, and board interlocks
(Hernandez et al., 2015; Mesquita et al., 2008; Pahnke et al., 2015). I complement
this emerging literature that has paid attention to formal, established ties by
suggesting that geographic co-location between an allying firm’s partner and its rivals
is an overlooked but important factor that can present risks of knowledge losses, and
incumbent firms respond to these risks through their alliance design choices.
I also contribute to the literature on R&D alliances between incumbent firms
and technology ventures. The literature has typically focused on misappropriation by
incumbent firms of the knowledge possessed by technology ventures. Since
technology ventures have greater difficulty in learning partner knowledge, controlling
knowledge flows, and reacting to misappropriation by partners (Alvarez & Barney,
2001), it makes sense that the previous literature has mainly focused on the
technology venture viewpoint. However, this exclusive focus on one side of the
partnership overlooks the fact that the counterpart (i.e., incumbent firms) might also
be concerned about knowledge loss. That is, I suggest that despite their superior
resources and bargaining power, incumbent firms are also prone to the risk of
knowledge loss in R&D alliances with technology ventures. In cases where this risk is
particularly salient, incumbent firms need to devise appropriate defensive
mechanisms. In this paper, I showed that incumbent firms’ choices of governance and
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task interdependence vary based on the degree to which their technology venture
counterparts are in geographic proximity to their major rivals.
My results using equity alliance and reciprocal interdependence as dependent
variables also make an interesting comparison with the previous literature that has
focused on partner selection as a means for technology ventures to deal with
knowledge misappropriation concerns (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila et al.,
2008). When taking the technology venture perspective, focusing on partner selection
is sensible because technology ventures normally lack the bargaining power to attain
other safeguards they might desire. Therefore, a realistic option to them might be to
avoid partnering with a certain incumbent firm when it entails a high risk of
misappropriation. By contrast, an incumbent firm may still enter into rather than
avoid an R&D alliance with a technology venture entailing a high risk of knowledge
loss because the incumbent firms’ superior bargaining power allows it to protect itself
by negotiating appropriate governance structures and level of task interdependence.
One related secondary contribution I make to the alliance literature is that I
further extend the important but relatively sparse literature treating task
interdependence as a decision variable (Oxley & Sampson, 2004) with finer measures
and results. Unlike alliance research that regards task interdependence as an
exogenously given condition mainly affecting alliance decisions by increasing
coordination costs (Gulati & Singh, 1998), this alternative view highlights that
alliance partners endogenously choose the level of task interdependence depending on
the level of misappropriation risk they face. The literature has typically used alliance
scope, i.e., whether a given R&D alliance includes downstream activities such as
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manufacturing and/or marketing, as a proxy for the level of interdependence. Despite
many benefits such as its alignment with theory and data availability, it does not
consider the heterogeneity in task interdependence among different R&D tasks. That
is, when an R&D alliance includes marketing activities but its R&D tasks are just
sequential, it is not clear that the R&D alliance with wide scope is always more
interdependent than a pure R&D alliance of which tasks are highly reciprocal.
Furthermore, since R&D-dedicated technology ventures might not be interested in the
knowledge related to manufacturing and marketing, the broader scope of R&D plus
manufacturing or marketing might not add substantially additional risk of knowledge
loss. Because my models explain the variation in the level of R&D task
interdependence controlling alliance scope, my results support based on a finer
measure that a level of task interdependence is a decision made by alliance partners
depending on the need for knowledge protection rather than an exogenously given
condition.
Lastly, I also contribute to the agglomeration literature by adding new insights
and findings to the research on the downsides of agglomeration. The predominant
emphasis in the agglomeration literature has been the benefits of geographic
clustering, particularly because geographic co-location fosters access to a pool of
knowledge spillovers. A small subset of the literature has raised the concern that
firms not only draw from but also contribute to that pool. This concern has led some
scholars to predict that firms with superior resources may be less likely to choose
clustered locations (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). If a firm believes the costs of rivals’
having access to knowledge spillovers from the firm outweighs the benefits of
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accessing the pool of spillovers generated by the co-located rivals, firms will avoid
entering clusters. I raise a similar concern in the context of allying with clustered
firms. Forming alliances with firms in clusters has been suggested as a way for
isolated firms to access the benefits of clusters (McCann & Folta, 2008), and
empirical research indicates that clustered firms are more likely to attract partners
(Rothaermel, 2002). While I agree that this represents an opportunity to indirectly tap
into the cluster’s pool of knowledge spillovers, my work emphasizes that the risk of
contributing to the pool and losing relative advantages still exists in these
relationships. Important incumbent firm knowledge may spill over via the technology
venture into the cluster where it is potentially accessible to rival firms. In cases where
a significant number of incumbent firms’ rivals are co-located with the technology
venture, the incumbent firm should take steps to reduce the potential for knowledge
losses.

4.5.2

Limitations and Future Research

This study has some limitations that provide fruitful opportunities for
extensions to address. In this paper, I focused only on the increasing risk of
knowledge spillovers and misappropriation when a technology venture is co-located
with the major rivals of its incumbent firm partner. In an R&D alliance between an
incumbent firm and a technology venture, knowledge shared with or newly created
with the technology venture inevitably resides within the technology venture and thus
the risk of knowledge spillovers and misappropriation obviously exists. As noted
above, however, geographic proximity between the technology venture and the

134
nearby rivals might also increase the benefit of knowledge spill-ins from the rivals to
the incumbent firm through the technology venture. Although this benefit of potential
knowledge spill-ins exists, it is relatively less certain because it depends on (1)
whether the technology venture has absorbed the knowledge of interest to the
incumbent firm (which is difficult to assess prior to a transaction with the technology
venture) and (2) the ability and willingness of the technology venture to transfer that
knowledge to the incumbent firm. For this reason, the risk of knowledge spillovers
and misappropriation is more obvious than the benefit of knowledge spill-ins in my
case and thus I focused on the former. However, future research could explore
situations where potential benefits of knowledge spill-ins plays a larger role than
potential risk of knowledge spillovers and misappropriation. For instance, when an
incumbent firm invests in the ownership of a technology venture through corporate
venture capital, knowledge transfers from the incumbent firm to the technology
venture do not necessarily take place, but the incumbent firm possesses property
rights on the knowledge of the technology venture. Therefore, while potential benefit
of knowledge spill-ins remains, potential risk of knowledge spillovers and
misappropriation might be relatively lower in this case.
In this paper, I highlighted co-location or geographic proximity between an
allying firm and its partner’s major rivals as a factor increasing the risk of knowledge
spillovers and misappropriation. However, there are other interesting relationships
between an allying firm and its partner’s major rivals that might influence the risk of
knowledge loss. Examples include, but are not limited to, prior ties, spin-offs, and
labor mobility between them. Since co-location or geographic proximity increases the
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likelihood of all these relationships and events, I focused on agglomeration and the
proximity of an incumbent firm’s rivals in this paper. However, each factor would be
meaningful and may potentially have different implications individually and
independently from geographic proximity per se. Future studies might examine how
each of these factors affects firms’ external corporate development activities in terms
of partner/target selection, governance choice, and the design of collaborative
agreements.

4.6

Conclusion

To the best of knowledge, this is the first empirical study that explicitly
examines how co-location between an allying technology venture and its incumbent
partner’s major rivals affect the design and governance of R&D alliances. I theorize
that co-location increases the risk of rivals’ gaining access to an incumbent firm’s
knowledge and, therefore, the incumbent firm mitigates this concern by (1) opting for
equity governance structures to provide greater incentive alignment, control, and
monitoring and (2) choosing less interdependent R&D projects to reduce knowledge
sharing. I further claim that the effects of rivalry in partner location on the usage of
these defense mechanisms strengthen with the absorptive capacity of nearby rivals.
My results largely support these theoretical arguments, and I hope this paper more
broadly stimulates future research that considers the implications of the competitive
context of collaboration, including potential dark sides of agglomeration.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I attempt to advance our understanding on the interplay
between competition and cooperation by examining how R&D collaborations are
affected by (1) direct competition between partner firms and (2) the geographic colocation between an allying firm’s partner and rivals.
More specifically, drawing on the multimarket competition literature, I argue
that the mutual forbearance that market overlap between R&D alliance partners
generates can curb opportunism and thus reduce the exchange hazards in their
collaborations. Based on this argument, in Essay 1 (Chapter 2), I claim and show that
as two firms share more markets, they estimate the partner’s inclination toward
opportunism as lower and are thus more likely to enter into a technology cooperation.
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) also supports that this effect is intensified for technology
cooperation with high technological uncertainty, as well as with a broad vertical
scope, because both cases entail a greater risk of opportunism, rendering partners’
proclivity toward opportunism more important as a criterion for partner selection.
Consistently, Essay 2 (Chapter 3) shows that multimarket rivals are less likely to
employ hierarchical governance structures for their collaborations due to the reduced
risk of opportunism between them. The competition-oriented cooperation literature
has argued that competition undermines cooperation by increasing the benefits
realized by opportunistic behaviors. However, my findings suggest the nature and
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number of market contacts might affect the possibility of partners’ retaliatory
responses to opportunism and the costs caused by the retaliation and therefore, these
factors should be considered to anticipate the effect of competition between alliance
partners on their cooperation.
In addition, by combining the multimarket competition literature and the
literature on relational embeddedness, Essay 2 (Chapter 3) also shows that different
dyadic relationships in which alliance partners are embedded jointly influence the
partners’ proclivity toward opportunism. That is, factor market rivalry intensifies the
mutual forbearance from opportunism that multimarket contact in end-product
markets generates, while previous cooperative experience (i.e., prior ties) dampens
the relative value of mutual forbearance due to market overlap as a remedy for
exchange hazards. These results also propose that it is important to consider the broad
economic—competitive or cooperative—context in which alliance partners are
embedded in predicting the level of cooperation hazards that the alliance partners
encounter and the consequential decisions concerning the collaboration.
The findings from Essay 1 (Chapter 2) and Essay 2 (Chapter 3) that market
overlap can enhance transaction efficiency by generating mutual forbearance from
opportunism provide a critical implication to the multimarket competition literature,
as well. The multimarket competition literature has entirely interpreted mutual
forbearance as tacit collusion that takes place across markets to earn monopolistic
rent and has paid exclusive attention to the benefit from multimarket contact via
rivalry restraint (Jayachandran et al., 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013). However, the
mechanism through which I claim market overlap benefits alliance partners is
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efficiency enhancement in transactions, and it has nothing to do with monopolistic
rent seeking. Therefore, my dissertation sheds new light on multimarket contact and
mutual forbearance in terms of efficiency considerations, calling for more future
research linking the multimarket competition literature with research on cooperative
strategy.
In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I combine the agglomeration literature with the
alliance literature to argue that the geographic co-location between an allying
technology venture and its incumbent partner’s major rivals creates indirect paths of
knowledge leakage to the nearby rivals, influencing the design of the R&D alliance as
a result. I maintain that when co-location aggravates the risk of rivals’ acquiring an
incumbent firm’s knowledge, the incumbent firm is more likely to (1) choose equitybased governance modes to enhance monitoring, control, and incentive alignment and
(2) reduce the level of task interdependence to limit knowledge sharing. Considering
nearby rivals’ ability to leverage external knowledge, as well as the exposure created
by geographic co-location between partners and rivals, I further argue that the effects
of rivalry in partner location on the usage of these defense mechanisms is intensified
by the absorptive capacity of nearby rivals. Based on these findings, I contribute not
only to the emerging literature on indirect knowledge leakage to rivals, but also to the
agglomeration literature.
Unlike the conventional competition-oriented cooperation literature that has
been mainly interested in knowledge leakage via direct interaction between alliance
partners (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989;
Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004), some recent research has
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suggested that knowledge leakages to rivals can take place via indirect linkages, as
well (Hernandez et al., 2015; Mesquita et al., 2008; Pahnke et al., 2015). However,
this stream of research has been interested only in formal inter-firm relationships as
an indirect channel of knowledge leakage to rivals. In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I
contribute to this emerging literature by suggesting geographic co-location between
partners and rivals as an interesting but understudied path that might aggravate
knowledge protection concerns.
The results from Essay 3 also extend the literature on the downsides of
agglomeration to the alliance context. The agglomeration literature has highlighted
knowledge spillovers in geographic clusters as the main benefit that incentivizes
firms to agglomerate, and only a small subset of the literature has suggested the
possible costs that firms with superior resources might incur by joining a pool of
knowledge spillovers (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). However, the literature has paid
attention to this concern in the context of location choice, but not in the context of
collaborating with clustered firms. Therefore, the findings in Essay 3 (Chapter 4)
contribute to this literature by providing evidence that the risk of contributing to the
pool and losing relative advantages also exists in partnerships with clustered firms,
particularly those who are co-located with rivals.
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APPENDIX
This section is to illustrate how Rivalry in Partner Location is calculated. For this
purpose, assume the followings:

1) Incumbent Firm i and Technology Venture j enter into an R&D alliance.
2) Technology Venture j is located in MSAc
3) Three top 10 rivals of Incumbent Firm i, Rivali1, Rivali2, and Rivali3, are also located in
MSAc while other top 10 rivals, i.e., Rivali4—Rivali10 are located elsewhere.
4) In the industry, there are five distinct markets (M1~M5) and the market sizes are all
$100.
5) Incumbent Firm i is present in three markets, M1, M2, and M3 and earns $50, $30, and
$20 from M1, M2, and M3 respectively.
6) Rivali1 is present in M1, M2, M3, and M4 and earns $20, $30, $50, and $10 from M1,
M2, M3, and M4 respectively.
7) Rivali2 is present in M1, M2, and M5 and earns $30, $30, and $10 from M1, M2, and M5
respectively.
8) Rivali3 is present in M2, M3, and M4 and earns $10, $20, and $30 from M2, M3, and M4
respectively.
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The following table summarizes the relevant firms’ revenues from each market.
M2
M1
Incumbent Firm i
$50
$30
Rivali1
$20
$30
Rivali2
$30
$30
Rivali3
$0
$10
Then, Rivalry in Partner Location
Importance
∑ MS
0.6

M3
M4
$20
$0
$50
$10
$0
$0
$20
$30
∑ Importance

∑ MS

M5
Total Revenue
$0
$100
$0
$110
$10
$70
$0
$60
∑ MS

Importance
Importance

∑ MS
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